

Fairwork

WORKING IN THE NIGERIAN

RIDE-HAILING SECTOR

Fairwork Nigeria Ratings



CONTENTS

03 Executive Summary

04 Key Findings

**08 The Fairwork Project: Towards Decent Labour Standards
in the Platform Economy**

10 The Fairwork Framework

14 Background: The Nigerian Ride-Hailing Sector

16 The Legal Context: What Makes a Worker an Employee?

18 Fairwork Nigeria Scores 2022

21 Theme in Focus: Health, Safety, and Security Challenges of Ride-hailing Drivers

24 Moving Forward: Fairwork's future activities in the Nigerian platform economy

26 The Fairwork Pledge

27 Appendix: Fairwork Scoring System

32 Endnotes


34 Credits and Funding

Executive Summary

This report represents the first Fairwork engagement with the Nigerian platform economy. It evaluates working conditions on three digital labour platforms in the Nigerian ride-hailing sector against five principles – fair pay, fair conditions, fair contracts, fair management, and fair representation – giving each a score out of ten. The platforms rated are Uber, Bolt and InDriver. The report highlights severe problems concerning working conditions on these platforms. None of the platforms in this Fairwork study could be awarded a point for any of the thresholds of the five Fairwork principles.



Key Findings



FAIR PAY

None of the platforms in the sample, Uber, Bolt or InDriver, could be awarded a point for fair pay, because the research team was unable to evidence that any platform ensures that workers earn above the minimum or the living wage after costs.

Although some workers we interviewed earned above the respective thresholds, work-related costs and individual earnings differed greatly and revealed instances of workers earning below minimum and living wage. Finally, no platform was willing or able to demonstrate an effective system or policy that ensures that these thresholds are met.



FAIR CONDITIONS

Worker interviews revealed severe grievances related to the safety and security of the drivers. Robberies, accidents and health issues due to stress and long working hours were mentioned among other issues.

The research was unable to evidence that any platform had policies in place to effectively protect workers from these risks. Some platforms offered insurance for workers while on a trip with passengers. But none of the platforms could evidence that workers are also protected while waiting for passengers. Effective means to reduce the risks of robberies and theft could also not be evidenced for any platform. In none of the cases did we find evidence that platforms provide income security to their drivers in the case of sickness or inability to work, that did not result from an accident while on a trip.



FAIR CONTRACTS

While there are terms and conditions available for drivers on all platforms, it is usually not governed by Nigerian law, making it difficult or impossible for workers to take legal action.

In addition, none of the platforms provided evidence to indicate that workers are notified of significant changes to the T&C in a reasonable timeframe before the changes come into effect. In addition, all of the platforms have clauses in their T&C excluding the platforms from all kinds of liabilities concerning the working relationship and shifting all of the risks stemming from the relationship onto workers.



FAIR MANAGEMENT

The worker interviews we undertook indicated that all platforms' communication channels were not very responsive. There are many instances where workers complain about being deactivated without warning and have no chance to appeal.

No platform provides evidence to indicate how their communication channels and appeal processes perform, and how long it takes them to answer worker complaints. For none of the platforms did we find an effective anti-discrimination policy.



FAIR REPRESENTATION

No platform provided evidence of their willingness to engage with unions or worker groups.

There are some corporate feedback mechanisms that (some!) workers are part of, but these initiatives do not qualify as a pathway for workers to bargain collectively or make their voices heard collectively.

Editorial

Digital ride-hailing platforms have fundamentally changed the Nigerian transportation sector in recent years. After Uber entered the Nigerian market in 2014, other global digital labour platforms followed, including Bolt in 2016 and InDriver in 2019. By offering lower prices than their local competitors, but also by using superior technological means, these platforms have become the dominant players in the Nigerian transport sector, employing some 15,000 drivers in Lagos alone, according to union representatives.

Because of this, working on ride-hailing platforms has become an attractive option for many Nigerians. Especially in the early days of ride-hailing platforms, high unemployment, particularly among young citizens, made working in the emerging platform economy attractive to many as a way to earn additional income.

HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, AMONG YOUNG CITIZENS, MADE WORKING IN EMERGING PLATFORM ECONOMY ATTRACTIVE

Workers were not the only ones with high expectations for the platform economy in Nigeria. The government also expected the emergence of international ride-hailing platforms to increase the transparency and efficiency of Nigeria's ride-hailing sector through new technological means such as algorithmic management and increased monitoring of drivers through real-time vehicle tracking.

However, while some of these expectations have certainly been met, the Nigerian ride-hailing sector has also seen an increase in labour unrest and organising attempts by worker collective bodies such as the National Union of Professional App-based Transport Workers (NUPABTW), the Professional E-hailing Drivers and Private Owners Associations and other

worker associations in recent years, pointing to serious issues and problems for workers on these platforms. Since 2017, these worker collective bodies have organised peaceful protests and dialogues to challenge unfair working conditions including low pay, high commissions, and the lack of safety and security for drivers.

To support Nigerian trade unions and workers' associations in their struggle for better working conditions, Fairwork decided to assess the main ride-hailing platforms in Lagos according to its five principles for fair work. The idea was to highlight key issues for workers in the platform industry and identify possible areas for improvement.

NONE OF THE THREE PLATFORMS ASSESSED MANAGED TO SCORE A SINGLE POINT DUE TO SERIOUS RISKS AND HAZARDS WORKING IN RIDE-HAILING SECTOR IN NIGERIA

As the findings presented in this report clearly show – with none of the three platforms assessed managing to score a single point – there are serious risks and hazards for people working in the ride-hailing sector in Nigeria. Low wages, dangerous working conditions, unfair contract terms that preclude platforms' liability for working conditions, lack of or



Akinyemi Olabode / Shutterstock

dysfunctional communication channels, and unwillingness to engage with unions or other forms of collective worker representation characterize the experiences of many ride-hailing workers.

In light of this experience, we are extremely pleased that this study, which represents Fairwork's first engagement with the Nigerian platform economy, will be followed up in the future by a newly formed Fairwork Nigeria team at the Lagos Business School (LBS) of Pan-Atlantic University. The team consists of lead researcher Prof. Olayinka David-West, co-researcher Dr Kemi Ogunyemi, and researchers Amaka

Anozie and Chinyere Emeshie. The team will include a broader range of digital labour platforms in its future work to provide a better and more comprehensive analysis of labour conditions in the Nigerian platform economy.

The team has already begun reaching out to several key stakeholders in the industry, from unions to the government to the platforms themselves, to create more awareness of the situation of Nigerian gig workers and hopefully help facilitate collaboration among stakeholders to improve working conditions in this important sector of the Nigerian economy.

Towards Decent Labour Standards in the Platform Economy

Fairwork evaluates and ranks the working conditions of digital platforms. Our ratings are based on five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure in order to be considered to be offering basic minimum standards of fairness.

We evaluate platforms annually against these principles to show not only what the platform economy is today, but also what it could be. The Fairwork ratings provide an independent perspective on labour conditions of platform work for policymakers, platform companies, workers, and consumers. Our goal is to show that better, and fairer, jobs are possible in the platform economy.

The Fairwork project is coordinated from the Oxford Internet Institute and the WZB Berlin Social Science Centre. Our growing network of researchers currently rates platforms in 38 countries across 5 continents. In every country, Fairwork collaborates closely with workers, platforms, advocates and policymakers to promote a fairer future of platform work.

Fairwork countries




Figure 1. Fairwork currently rates platforms in 38 countries worldwide.

AFRICA

Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda

ASIA

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam

EUROPE

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, UK, Serbia, Spain

SOUTH AMERICA

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

NORTH AMERICA

Mexico, USA

The Fairwork Framework

Fairwork evaluates the working conditions of digital labour platforms and ranks them on how well they do. Ultimately, our goal is to show that better, and fairer, jobs are possible in the platform economy.

To do this, we use five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure to be considered as offering 'fair work'. We evaluate platforms against these principles to show not only what the platform economy is, but also what it can be.

The five Fairwork principles were developed through multiple multi-stakeholder workshops at the International Labour Organisation. To ensure that these global principles were applicable in the UK context, we have subsequently revised and fine-tuned them in consultation with platform workers, platforms, trade unions, regulators, academics, and labour lawyers.

Further details on the thresholds for each principle, and the criteria used to assess the collected evidence to score platforms can be found in the Appendix.




STEP 1

The five principles



Fair Pay

Workers, irrespective of their employment classification, should earn a decent income in their home jurisdiction after taking account of work-related costs. We assess earnings according to the mandated minimum wage in the home jurisdiction, as well as the current living wage.



Fair Conditions

Platforms should have policies in place to protect workers from foundational risks arising from the processes of work, and should take proactive measures to protect and promote the health and safety of workers.



Fair Contracts

Terms and conditions should be accessible, readable and comprehensible. The party contracting with the worker must be subject to local law and must be identified in the contract. Regardless of the workers' employment status, the contract is free of clauses which unreasonably exclude liability on the part of the service user and/or the platform.




Fair Management

There should be a documented process through which workers can be heard, can appeal decisions affecting them, and be informed of the reasons behind those decisions. There must be a clear channel of communication to workers involving the ability to appeal management decisions or deactivation. The use of algorithms is transparent and results in equitable outcomes for workers. There should be an identifiable and documented policy that ensures equity in the way workers are managed on a platform (for example, in the hiring, disciplining, or firing of workers).



Fair Representation

Platforms should provide a documented process through which worker voice can be expressed. Irrespective of their employment classification, workers should have the right to organise in collective bodies, and platforms should be prepared to cooperate and negotiate with them.



STEP 2

Methodology

The Fairwork project uses three approaches to effectively measure fairness of working conditions at digital labour platforms: desk research, worker interviews and surveys, and interviews with platform management. Through these three methods, we seek evidence on whether platforms act in accordance with the five Fairwork Principles.

We recognise that not all platforms use a business model that allows them to impose certain contractual terms on service users and/or workers in such a way that meets the thresholds of the Fairwork principles. However, all platforms have the ability to influence the way in which users interact on the platform. Therefore, for platforms that do not set the terms on which workers are retained by service users, we look at a number of other factors including published policies and/or procedures, public statements, and website/app functionality to establish whether the platform has taken appropriate steps to ensure they meet the criteria for a point to be awarded against the relevant principle.

In the case of a location-based work platform, we seek evidence of compliance with our Fairwork principles for location-based or 'gig work' platforms, and in the case of a cloudwork platform, with our Fairwork principles for cloudwork platforms.

Desk research

Each annual Fairwork ratings cycle starts with desk research to map the range of platforms to be scored, identify points of contact with management, develop suitable interview guides and survey instruments, and design recruitment strategies to access workers. For each platform, we also gather and analyse a wide range of documents including contracts, terms and conditions, published policies and procedures, as well as digital interfaces and website/app functionality. Desk research also flags up any publicly available information that could assist us in scoring different platforms, for instance the provision of particular services to workers, or the existence of past or ongoing disputes.

The desk research is also used to identify points of contact

or ways to access workers. Once the list of platforms has been finalised, each platform is contacted to alert them about their inclusion in the annual ranking study and to provide them with information about the process. All platforms are asked to assist with evidence collection as well as with contacting workers for interviews.

Platform interviews

The second method involves approaching platforms for evidence. Platform managers are invited to participate in semi-structured interviews as well as to submit evidence for each of the Fairwork principles. This provides insights into the operation and business model of the platform, while also opening up a dialogue through which the platform could agree to implement changes based on the principles. In cases where platform managers do not agree to interviews, we limit our scoring to evidence obtained through desk research and worker interviews.

Worker interviews

The third method is interviewing platform workers directly. A sample of 6-10 workers are interviewed for each platform. These interviews do not aim to build a representative sample. They instead seek to understand the processes of work and the ways it is carried out and managed. These interviews enable the Fairwork researchers to see copies of the contracts issued to workers, and learn about platform policies that pertain to workers. The interviews also allow the team to confirm or refute that policies or practices are really in place on the platform.

Workers are approached using a range of different channels. For our 2022 ratings, this included, in addition to our tried and tested participant recruitment methods, Facebook and Twitter advertisements and snowballing from prior interviews. In all these strategies informed consent was established, with interviews conducted both in person and online.

The interviews were semi-structured and made use of a series of questions relating to the 10 Fairwork (sub)

principles. In order to qualify for the interviews, workers had to be over the age of 18 and have worked with the platform for more than two months. All interviews were conducted in English.

Putting it all together

This threefold approach provides a way to cross-check the claims made by platforms, while also providing the opportunity to collect both positive and negative evidence from multiple sources. Final scores are collectively decided by the Fairwork team based on all three forms of evidence. Points are only awarded if clear evidence exists on each threshold.


How we score

Each of the five Fairwork principles is broken down into two points: a first point and a more second point that can only be awarded if the basic point has been fulfilled. Every platform receives a score out of 10. Platforms are only given a point when they can satisfactorily demonstrate their implementation of the principles. Failing to achieve a point

does not necessarily mean that a platform does not comply with the principle in question. It simply means that we are not – for whatever reason – able to evidence its compliance.

The scoring involves a series of stages. First, the in-country team collates the evidence and assigns preliminary scores. The collated evidence is then sent to external reviewers for independent scoring. These reviewers are both members of the Fairwork teams in other countries, as well as members of the central Fairwork team. Once the external reviewers have assigned their scoring, all reviewers meet to discuss the scores and decide final scoring. These scores, as well as the justification for them being awarded or not, are then passed to the platforms for review. Platforms are then given the opportunity to submit further evidence to earn points that they were initially not awarded. These scores then form the final annual scoring that is published in the annual country Fairwork reports.

FURTHER DETAILS ON THE FAIRWORK SCORING SYSTEM ARE IN THE APPENDIX.



BACKGROUND

The Nigerian Ride-Hailing Sector

This report focuses on the ride-hailing sector in Nigeria, focusing specifically on Uber, Bolt, and In-driver. Before Uber entered Nigeria in 2014, the existing taxi regime comprised yellow taxis, red taxis and (increasingly) Metro taxis which incorporated the use of taxi meters to calculate fares in an attempt to digitise the taxi experience.¹ This report focuses on the ride-hailing sector in Nigeria, focusing specifically on Uber, Bolt, and In-driver. Before Uber entered Nigeria in 2014, the existing taxi regime comprised yellow taxis, red taxis and (increasingly) Metro taxis which incorporated the use of taxi meters to calculate fares in an attempt to digitise the taxi experience.²

This report focuses on the ride-hailing sector in Nigeria, focusing specifically on Uber, Bolt, and In-driver. Before Uber entered Nigeria in 2014, the existing taxi regime comprised yellow taxis, red taxis and (increasingly) Metro taxis which incorporated the use of taxi meters to calculate fares in an attempt to digitise the taxi experience.³ There was also the Easy Taxi platform, founded by Tallis Gomes in Brazil, and introduced in Nigeria in 2013 as a means to reduce wait times by connecting passengers to the nearest driver in real-time via the mobile application. Similarly, Afrocabs, an indigenous ride-hailing platform, began its services in early 2014 with a price-haggling feature embedded in the app, typifying the local culture of negotiating a fare before embarking on a trip.⁴ Despite these early examples of “platform taxis”, they didn’t take off because many drivers were elderly with poor educational backgrounds, and thus less likely to adopt these platforms. Other factors included the difficulty in managing drivers in real-time, a lack of understanding of doing business in Nigeria, lack of funding,

circumvention of the app, and, more significantly, the emergence of international ride-hailing platforms from 2014 onwards.⁵ To date, traditional taxis such as yellow taxis in Lagos still exist, but have generally been usurped by ride-hailing platforms due to their superior technology and lower fares.

Indeed, it was the shortcomings in the taxi industry that created the entry point for Uber in 2014. But more importantly, increasing levels of unemployment in Nigeria from 3.7% in 2013 to 4.5% in 2014⁶ made Uber’s business model look appealing, with drivers recognised as “partners”. Uber’s tagline “be your own boss” became a strategy to lure even white-collar workers and other potential drivers from the confines of a traditional working environment to become full-time or part-time Uber drivers with an increased possibility of making more income.⁷ Uber paved the way for other global platforms to enter the Nigerian market, including Bolt in 2016 and In-driver in 2019. The Bolt platform emerged at the beginning of the recession



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in 2016 – when the overall unemployment rate stood at 7.1% and youth unemployment at 12.4%.⁸ While Bolt and Uber both have local offices in Nigeria, In-driver, which entered Nigeria in 2019, exists only within the app, with drivers complaining about its invisible presence in the labour management process. While there are no official statistics on ride-hailing drivers in Nigeria, Uber claimed in 2018 that it had 9,000 drivers in Nigeria, with Bolt claiming 10,000.⁹ Representatives from the NUPABTW and PEDPA collective worker bodies we interviewed claim there are currently over 15,000 drivers in Lagos alone.

The common feature of these platforms is the ability for users to access rides in shorter times at the touch of a button.¹⁰ The labour process is managed by algorithms which facilitate trip assignments, performance evaluations using metrics (e.g., ratings, and cancellation and acceptance rates), monitoring trip assignments, administering payments and bonuses, and implementing sanctions and bans for defaulting drivers.¹¹ Working for these platforms is as simple as registering your vehicle with the platform after inspections, providing the

necessary documentation, undergoing compulsory training, and possessing a smartphone device with the required operating system. While Uber, Bolt, and In-driver admit drivers with vehicles manufactured as far back as 2000, most drivers register with more recent brands like the Toyota Corolla, Toyota Camry, and Hondas. These three car brands have therefore become part of the identities of a typical ride-hailing driver in Nigeria.¹²

These digitised labour management aspects of ride-hailing platforms are expected to enhance users' safety and security, and improve the overall transparency of the taxi sector in Nigeria.¹³ However, as this report will go on to describe, the safety and security of the drivers themselves is increasingly an issue, given they are exposed to robbery attacks, harassment from riders, fatigue, and increased risk of road accidents. However, with the need to earn a livelihood and few alternatives in the local labour market, drivers continue to bear the risk of working without proper regulation or support from platforms.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT

What Makes a Worker an Employee?

Ride-hailing drivers in Nigeria, like in most countries, are legally classified as independent contractors, meaning that the working relationship between drivers and platforms is not explicitly covered by employment law.¹⁴ This means that the existing labour laws which should protect workers against unfair working conditions do not apply, including the rights to challenge arbitrary dismissal, to earn a minimum wage (as well as other rights), and the provision of social security for all workers.


According to Section 91 (1) of the Nigerian Labour Act, 2004, a worker “is any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour or clerical work or is expressed or implied or oral or written, and whether it is a contract of service or a contract personally to execute any work or labour”.¹⁵

In straightforward terms, the Nigerian Labour classification of workers does not define platform work or independent contractors, and neither does it capture the nuances of platform work or the realities of drivers. In any case, ride-hailing platforms do not consider drivers to be employees classifying them instead as independent contractors, which goes beyond the extent of the labour law in Nigeria. This means that drivers are not entitled to employment benefits or compensation if anything goes wrong on the job. By contrast, employees, according to the Employee’s Compensation Act of 2010 (which repeals the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 2004) compensation is due to employees and dependents who suffer sickness, accident, injury, disability or death relating to their work.¹⁶

For many drivers in Nigeria, there are advantages to working for ride-hailing platforms, including the potential



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to make additional income and the ability to choose working schedules. However, evidence from this study demonstrates that drivers are increasingly experiencing unfair working conditions based on the misclassification of their working status. With no clear legislation to guarantee that platform workers are entitled to protections, dismissive or unfair treatment of drivers by platform companies is facilitated. Without an extant law being applied to the labour process, workers embody more risks by working long hours and are subject to opaque contracts or terms and conditions, as well as arbitrary deactivations without any recourse.¹⁷ For instance, if a driver is blocked unfairly by the app, there is no recognised appeals process or option for legal redress because of the restrictive clauses in their contracts, or the platform being governed by laws from a different jurisdiction. Reports of drivers being blocked for bad ratings, high cancellation rates or other non-transparent reasons were recurrent in this study, and in all the cases, they had to wait till the ban was removed. On top of this, platforms take core decisions such as fare reductions without properly consulting with drivers.

Gradually in Global South countries, drivers through collective efforts, are beginning to challenge the laws of platform labour. In Kenya, 34 drivers filed a suit against Uber Kenya Limited in 2016, claiming that Uber breached its minimum fare contract as signed by drivers, which impacted earnings.¹⁸ According to the court documents for instance, it was stated that the initial contract signed was for drivers to carry passengers at a minimum of \$0.54 per kilometre with a minimum fare of \$2.71. However, in

July 2016, the minimum fare per kilometre was reduced to \$0.32 and the base fare was reduced to \$1.81 per trip without notifying drivers and further impacting the ability their ability to make profits.¹⁹ In response, Uber claimed that the plaintiffs were contracted under a different jurisdiction which is Uber BV (Netherlands) and not Uber Kenya Limited and thus were not liable for any breach of any contractual obligations. The high court dismissed Uber's claim and has recently passed a landmark ruling in 2021 that establishes the connection between Uber BV (Netherlands) and Uber Kenya Limited. While this ruling did not yet lead to the classification of drivers as employees, it will build momentum towards the recognition of platform workers' rights in Kenya. counts as incremental changes that will ultimately lead to recognition of the rights of platform workers in Kenya.

While there are efforts to regulate the affairs of platforms in Nigeria, such as the current licensing fees imposed by the government,²⁰ there is still a long way to go. In 2017, two drivers, representing all Uber and Bolt drivers, filed a class action at the Industrial Court in Lagos against Uber and Bolt,²¹ calling for them to recognise drivers as employees under the Labour Act Section 91 (1).²² While this was ultimately unsuccessful due to insufficient evidence of an employer-employee relationship presented by the drivers, this class action, in conjunction with knowledge of victories from other contexts, has paved the way for drivers in Nigeria to continue to demand fair practices and decent work standards in the platform economy.

Fairwork Nigeria Scores 2022

Minimum standards
of fair work

Bolt

0/10



InDriver

0/10



Uber

0/10




The scores presented in this report are based on data gathered using the Fairwork Framework as laid out in the Methodology section. After desk research was conducted, at least six workers from each of the platforms were interviewed, and the research team also gathered additional evidence from platform management representatives who were willing and able to collaborate. For each principle, a platform can be awarded one point for the first threshold

and another point for the second threshold, leading to a total of 10 points. Second points are only awarded if the first point is already granted. If a point is not granted, this does not necessarily mean that the platform does not fulfil the requirements, but rather that the research team could not evidence it. The Appendix provides further details of the evidence used to score each point and how data was gathered.

**THE BREAKDOWN OF SCORES FOR
INDIVIDUAL PLATFORMS
CAN BE SEEN ON OUR WEBSITE:**


FAIR.WORK/NIGERIA

Explaining the scores



Fair Pay

The first Fairwork principle relates to fair pay with the first threshold being the national legal minimum wage and the second being the local living wage level after job-related costs. For both thresholds, the Fairwork methodology does not operate with average earnings but emphasises the need for platforms to provide evidence that there is a mechanism in place to ensure that all workers earn at least the respective wage levels when working for the platform. In this regard, none of the platforms in the sample could be awarded a point for either principle 1.1 or 1.2. This is not to say that there were no workers in the interview sample that earned above the minimum or even living wage – there were. But the income levels as well as the individual cost structures differed greatly. Based on serviced areas, availability of vehicles and equipment needed to operate as a platform driver, workers' earnings varied. Accordingly, the actual earnings of workers on the platform could well be above or below the respective thresholds, with examples being found in the interview sample for both cases. No platform provided additional evidence to indicate that there is a mechanism in place to ensure that workers do indeed meet the thresholds necessary for awarding a point for this principle.



Fair Conditions

We were unable to award any platform a point for principles 2.1 or 2.2. We did not find any evidence that InDriver provides any insurance coverage for its drivers at all, and while Uber and Bolt offer accident insurance for drivers while on a trip with customers, drivers are not protected while waiting for rides and cruising through the city, so neither platform can be awarded this point. The worker interviews also revealed severe grievances concerning the safety and security of drivers, but we could find no evidence that this was being addressed by any of the platforms. In none of the cases did we find evidence that the platforms provide income security to their drivers in the case of sickness or inability to work, that did not result from an accident while on a trip.




Fair Contracts

The third principle concerns the availability and transparency of the contracts or terms and conditions, as well as the liabilities shared by platforms and drivers. According to our data, none of the platforms proved eligible for any point in this respect. While there were terms and conditions available for drivers on all three platforms, none of them is subject to Nigerian law, making it difficult for workers to take legal action. In addition, none of the platforms provided evidence to indicate that workers are notified of significant changes to the T&C in advance in a reasonable timeframe. In addition, all of the platforms have clauses in their T&C excluding the platforms from all kinds of liabilities concerning the working relationship and shifting all of the risks stemming from the relationship onto workers.



Fair Representation

While there is a union and several worker groups voicing workers' concerns in the industry, no platform provided evidence of their willingness to engage with any of the groups. There are some corporate feedback mechanisms that (some!) workers are part of, but these initiatives do not qualify as a pathway for workers to bargain collectively or make their voices heard collectively. Accordingly, no platform could evidence democratic governance or worker representation on the platform. Hence, again, no platform could be awarded a point for this principle.



Fair Management

Principle 4 concerns fair management processes. While Uber and Bolt both offer communication channels via the app and email that workers can use to appeal disciplinary actions like deactivations and bad ratings, the worker interviews indicated that none of these communication channels is very responsive. There were instances reported of workers complaining about being temporarily deactivated without warning and having no chance to appeal. The reported reaction times to appeals also differed a lot, from several days to no answer at all, even in urgent instances like workers being robbed while working. According to our worker data, InDriver does not provide a communication channel outside of the app, and the communication channel was reported to be non-responsive. Several cases of unilateral blockages were reported by workers. No platform provided evidence to indicate how their communication channels perform and how long it takes them to answer worker complaints. As a result, no platform was awarded a point for principle 4.

THEME IN FOCUS

Health, Safety, and Security Challenges of Ride-hailing Drivers

The emergence of ride-hailing platforms in many cities of the Global South has prompted the idea that technology can improve the safety and security of workers. In many African countries, including Nigeria, ride-hailing platforms possess digital identities through the app, a rating system for driver/ rider evaluations, working time caps, panic buttons, and emergency contact numbers embedded in the app. However, this does not mean that workers necessarily experience fair working conditions; our findings indeed show quite the opposite.

In terms of health and well-being, working on ride-hailing platforms can lead to negative health impacts on drivers due to the long working hours. Kabiru* (31), a driver for both Uber and Bolt, told us that “driving in Lagos is very stressful – to drive in Lagos, you have to be insane. Apart from driving for long, environmental hazard such as pollution is there, and a long time sitting position affects your back. Driving gets you older than you look like if you don’t take good care of yourself.” While Uber has a working time cap of 12 hours on and six hours off (which exceeds the standard eight hours of working time per day), neither Bolt nor InDriver limited working time for drivers. Indeed, some of the drivers we interviewed reported working between 60 and 80 hours per week to make ends meet. Drivers also reported health challenges and were

aware of the long-term impacts of sitting down for a long time while driving or searching for trips. They complained of backaches, arm and muscle pains, high blood pressure, headaches, and fatigue. One driver, Temi (39), told us that lack of sleep and fatigue contribute to driving accidents.

In terms of safety and security, we found that drivers are often at risk, for example experiencing robbery attacks, road accidents, assaults and loss of life without investigation and compensation from ride-hailing platforms. These experiences have also been reported to us by drivers in other African countries including Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, where they protest against the lack of safety and security experience in their everyday work.²³ For example, in our Fairwork Ghana Report, 2021, a driver described how four men attacked him



vic josh / Shutterstock

with guns and machetes after accepting a woman's trip. According to the driver, his personal belongings were taken, including his smartphone, laptop, and money. The platform only claimed to suspend the rider. However, there was no indication that the rider was suspended or proper investigation of what happened.

There is often a low barrier of entry for riders, including little scrutiny such as proper background checks for riders when signing up to platforms compared to drivers, which contribute to the information asymmetries exposing these drivers to potential harm.²⁴ The poor verification of riders' information, makes it easier for riders who may have been deactivated due to concerns from drivers, can re-enter the platform ecosystem with a different identification or mobile number and may cause problems for drivers. In this study, the drivers we spoke to highlight the unequal and unverifiable nature of rider bio-information by platforms as an underlying factor that expose them

to risks. For instance, drivers argue that riders that are not properly verified are often involved in incidents of robbery, assault, and even killing of drivers. Because of the false information provided, it is often difficult to trace perpetrators of these acts.

All the drivers we interviewed for this study could relate at least had one scenario where they felt unsafe before, during and after completing a trip. One of the drivers, Jacob (42), highlighted how he has fought for his life several times with little or no support from platforms. Notably, a few months after the interview, in January 2022, Jacob experienced a fatal event where he fought off two riders who attempted to steal his vehicle. Jacob was severely bruised and hospitalised as a result of the event.

One interviewee, Folake (34), a female driver for all three ride-hailing platforms assessed in this report, told us of her experience on inDriver:

“There was this day I wanted to go and pick a rider. But for the location where he put the map, I could not find anything when I got there, and when I called, he asked me to be coming. I told him I could not see anything; this place is looking so isolated. So, I just reversed my car, as I was reversing two guys came from ahead of me and the guy, I was on the call with asked me to wait where I was. I told him I had to end the ride because I was not at peace with the way they were coming at me. He was like the guys coming are his friends and that they were going together. I zoomed off, and when I got to the beginning of the road. The guy called me again and asked if I was still there, I told him that I was not. He laughed hysterically and said, ‘God saved you’ just keep going and don’t pick anybody from this area. If I had waited, I don’t know what could have happened to me, maybe I’d have been robbed of my car or anything”

Folake’s experience is the reality of many ride-hailing drivers in Lagos because they have to rely on their intuition to avoid being assaulted, robbed or killed while working for the platform.

As was publicly reported in September 2021, a medical doctor and Uber driver was killed in Abule-egba in Lagos by three suspects after he was requested via the app by one of the riders.²⁵ The young doctor had started driving for Uber as a part-time gig to make ends meet. Worker collective groups like NUPABTW and PEDPA have been protesting against the killings and lack of safety in working for these platforms. In an interview with the Vanguard online newspaper, one of the representatives of PEDPA highlighted that 20 of their members were reported missing, with another 15 killed on the job.²⁶ Yet, even in these challenging scenarios, when drivers feel unsafe on specific trips, the app often favours the rider without having undertaken a proper investigation”. In some cases, drivers are blocked from the platform due to low ratings and high cancellation rates. On the other hand, riders are barely blocked from the platform when they default,

and in cases where they are deactivated, they can re-enter the platform under a different name, which may be detrimental to drivers.

With all these health, safety, and security challenges, the drivers we spoke to repeatedly pointed out the lack or inadequacy of mitigation strategies and safety measures, including accident insurance (except on a trip), health insurance, compensation, sick leave and other social protection benefits. For example, one of the drivers in this study highlighted how platforms do not compensate drivers for stolen vehicles or personal items, and how these platforms sometimes deny help to driver-victims by withholding information necessary for investigations in scenarios of robbery or assault, especially when their accounts have been deactivated.

As a mitigation measure, drivers have been calling for the profiling of riders to enhance their safety, by using their passports, National Identification Numbers (NIN), or Bank Verification Numbers (BVN) to determine their true identities.²⁷ That said, there is no centralised identification system in Nigeria that unifies the decentralised identification mediums like the NIN, BVN, Telcos, and others. For example, in 2019, the Director-General of the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) highlighted that only 36 million out of approximately 200 million Nigerians possessed a NIN.²⁸ Further compounding this problem is the poor addressing system. The Nigeria Post and Telecommunications Service (NIPOST) reports that only a fifth of the population can receive mail at home.²⁹

Despite these structural issues, ride-hailing platforms still possess the power to rectify this information asymmetry, such as is being done with strict driver profiling, which limits the risky behaviours of riders. In Ghana, for instance, ride-hailing platforms like Black Ride and Swift-Wheels have instituted profiling via the app to verify rider information.³⁰ These examples are evidence that ride-hailing platforms possess the capability to sanitise the unsafe working environment highlighted by drivers even in environments that do not have a robust or central identification system. They can start by including drivers in the decision-making process, deliberating on safety measures, and implementing some ideas to improve the security and protection of drivers.

***Names changed to protect worker’s identity**

MOVING FORWARD

Fairwork's future activities in the Nigerian platform economy

Following this first Fairwork study in Nigeria, the official Fairwork Nigeria team was established in May 2022 in collaboration with Lagos Business School (LBS), Pan-Atlantic University.




Figure 1: Pathways of Change

The team comprises principal investigator Prof. Olayinka David-West, co-investigator Dr Kemi Ogunyemi, and researchers Amaka Anozie and Chinyere Emeshie. The team has already engaged in a successful stakeholder workshop where they introduced the Fairwork principles, and presented an overview of the platform economy in Nigeria, and started scoring platforms in Nigeria. In contrast to this study, which only focused on major ride-hailing platforms, the Fairwork Nigeria team intends to examine at least ten platforms across the transport and delivery sectors with a report release scheduled for the end of the year.

The team will continue Fairwork's efforts to shed light on and improve working conditions in the Nigerian platform economy. This way, we hope that not only this study but also the follow-up research conducted in Nigeria will help engage with the following stakeholders:

Platforms

Our first and most direct pathway to improving working conditions in the platform economy is by engaging directly with platforms operating in Nigeria. While communication with platforms has unfortunately remained very limited

in the context of this study, it is our sincere hope that the continued work of the Nigerian team will help platforms become aware of their responsibilities and begin a dialogue with other stakeholders on how to improve working conditions for their workers.

Policymakers and Regulators

Fairwork also intends to engage with policymakers and the government to advocate for extending appropriate legal protections to all platform workers, irrespective of their legal classification. Building on our research findings from this study, Fairwork will look to expand our policy advocacy efforts to help ensure that workers' needs and platforms' business imperatives are effectively balanced in Nigeria. The low scores presented in this study illustrate the need for regulatory intervention to ensure that gig workers don't continue to fall through the cracks.


Workers and Workers' Associations

Workers and workers' organisations are at the core of Fairwork's model. First, our principles have been developed and are continually refined in close consultation with workers and their representatives (see Figure 2). Our fieldwork data and feedback from workshops and consultations involving workers inform how we systematically evolve the Fairwork principles to align

with their needs. Second, through continual engagement with workers' representatives and advocates, we aim to support workers in asserting their rights and requirements collectively.

A key challenge in the gig economy is that workers are often isolated, atomised, and placed in competition with one another. Furthermore, regulatory frameworks do not readily support platform workers to establish representative bodies such as trade unions, as they are seen as self-employed or independent businesses. As such, the platform work model presents challenges for workers to connect and create networks of solidarity. But unions and associations in Nigeria, including the National Union of Professional App-based Transport Workers (NUPABTW), the Professional E-hailing Drivers and Private Owners Association (PEDPA) and others, have sought to represent platform workers in the ride-hailing sector – indeed, some of the workers we interviewed said they would want to join a union. Our principles can provide a starting point for envisioning a fairer future of work and setting out a pathway to realising that. Principle Five in particular, on the importance of fair representation, is a crucial way in which we aim to support workers to assert their collective agency in Nigeria.

Figure 2 Fairwork's Principles: Continuous Worker-guided Evolution



The Fairwork Pledge

As part of its pathways of change, Fairwork has introduced a pledge. This pledge leverages the power of organisations' procurement, investment, and partnership policies to support fairer platform work. Organisations like universities, schools, businesses, and charities that use, or do not, platform labour can make a difference by supporting good labour practices, guided by our five principles of fair work.

The pledge consists of two levels. On the first level, organisations can sign as an official Fairwork Supporter, which entails publicly demonstrating support for fairer platform work, and making resources available to staff and members to help them decide which platforms to engage with. The second level of the pledge is Fairwork Partners, which entails organisations committing to concrete and meaningful changes in their practices. For example, Fairwork Partners can commit to using better-rated platforms where there is a choice. Organisations who sign the pledge as Partners get to display our badge on company materials.

MORE INFORMATION ON THE PLEDGE, AND HOW TO SIGN UP, IS AVAILABLE AT

WWW.FAIR.WORK/PLEDGE



APPENDIX

Fairwork Scoring System

Which companies are covered by the Fairwork principles?

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines a “digital labour platform” as an enterprise that mediates and facilitates “labour exchange between different users, such as businesses, workers and consumers”³¹. That includes digital labour “marketplaces” where “businesses set up the tasks and requirements and the platforms match these to a global pool of workers who can complete the tasks within the specified time”³². Marketplaces that do not facilitate labour exchanges - for example, Airbnb (which matches owners of accommodation with those seeking to rent short-term accommodation) and eBay (which matches buyers and sellers of goods) - are excluded from the definition. The ILO’s definition of “digital labour platform” is widely accepted and includes many different business models³³.

Fairwork’s research covers digital labour platforms that fall within this definition that aim to connect individual service providers with consumers of the service through the platform interface. Fairwork’s research does not cover platforms that mediate offers of employment between individuals and employers (whether on a long-term or a temporary basis).

Fairwork distinguishes between two types of these platforms. The first is ‘geographically-tethered’ platforms where the work is required to be done in a particular

location such as delivering food from a restaurant to an apartment, driving a person from one part of town to another or cleaning. These are often referred to as ‘gig work platforms’. The second is ‘cloudwork’ platforms where the work can, in theory, be performed from any location via the internet.

The thresholds for meeting each principle are different for location-based and cloudwork platforms because location-based work platforms can be benchmarked against local market factors, risks/harms, and regulations that apply in that country. In contrast, cloudwork platforms cannot because (by their nature) the work be performed from anywhere and so different market factors, risks/harms, and regulations apply, depending on where the work is performed.

The platforms covered by Fairwork’s research have different business, revenue, and governance models, including employment-based, subcontractor, commission-based, franchise, piece-rate, shift-based, and subscription models. Some of those models involve the platforms making direct payments to workers (including through sub-contractors).

How does the scoring system work?

The five Principles of Fairwork were developed through an extensive literature review of published research on job quality, stakeholder meetings at UNCTAD and the ILO in Geneva (involving platform operators, policymakers, trade unions, and academics), and in-country meetings with local stakeholders.

Each Fairwork Principle is divided into two thresholds. Accordingly, for each Principle, the scoring system allows the first to be awarded corresponding to the first

threshold and an additional second point to be awarded corresponding to the second threshold (see Table 1). The second point under each Principle can only be awarded if the first point for that Principle has been awarded. The thresholds specify the evidence required for a platform to receive a given point. Where no verifiable evidence is available that meets a given threshold, the platform is not awarded that point.

Table 1 Fairwork: Scoring System

	Principle 1: Fair Pay		Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs		Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs	
	Principle 2: Fair Conditions		Mitigates task-specific risks		Provides a safety net	
	Principle 3: Fair Contracts		Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions		Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed	
	Principle 4: Fair Management		Provides due process for decisions affecting workers		Provides equity in the management process	
	Principle 5: Fair Representation		Assures freedom of association and the expression of collective worker voice		Supports democratic governance	

Maximum possible Fairwork Score



Principle 1: Fair Pay

1.1 Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs (one point)

Platform workers often have substantial work-related costs to cover, such as transport between jobs, supplies, fuel, insurance, and maintenance on a vehicle³⁴. Workers' costs sometimes mean their take-home earnings may fall below the local minimum wage³⁵. Workers also absorb the costs of an extra time commitment when they spend time waiting or travelling between jobs or other unpaid activities necessary for their work, which are also considered active hours³⁶. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below the local minimum wage.

The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure:

- Workers earn at least the local minimum wage or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) where they work, in their active hours, after costs³⁷.

1.2 Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs (one additional point)

In some places, the minimum wage is not enough to allow workers to afford a basic but decent standard of living. To achieve this point platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local living wage.

The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure:

- Workers earn at least a local living wage or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) where they work, in their active hours, after costs^{38,39}.

Principle 2: Fair Conditions

2.1 Mitigates task-specific risks (one point)

Platform workers may encounter a number of risks in the course of their work, including accidents and injuries, harmful materials, and crime and violence. To achieve this point platforms must show that they are aware of these risks and take steps to mitigate them.

The platform must satisfy the following:

- There are policies or practices in place that protect workers' health and safety from task-specific risks⁴⁰.
- Platforms take adequate, responsible, and ethical data protection and management measures in a documented policy.

2.2 – Provides a safety net (one additional point)

Platform workers are vulnerable to the possibility of abruptly losing their income as the result of unexpected or external circumstances, such as sickness or injury. Most countries provide a social safety net to ensure workers don't experience sudden poverty due to circumstances outside their control. However, platform workers usually don't qualify for protections such as sick pay, because of their independent contractor status. In recognition of the fact that most workers are dependent on income they earn from platform work, platforms can achieve this point by ensuring that workers are compensated for loss of income due to inability to work.

The platform must satisfy BOTH of the following:

- Platforms take meaningful steps to ensure that workers are compensated for income loss due to inability to work commensurate with the worker's average earnings over the past three months.
- Where workers are unable to work for an extended period due to unexpected circumstances, their standing on the platform is not negatively impacted.

Principle 3: Fair Contracts

3.1 Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions (one point)

The terms and conditions governing platform work are not always clear and accessible to workers⁴¹. To achieve this point, the platform must demonstrate that workers can understand, agree to, and access their work conditions at all times and that they have legal recourse if the other party breaches those conditions.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- The party contracting with the worker must be identified in the contract, and subject to the law of the place in which the worker works.
- The contract is communicated in full in clear and comprehensible language that workers could be expected to understand.
- The contract is accessible to workers at all times.
- Every worker is notified of proposed changes in a reasonable timeframe before changes come into effect; and the changes should not reverse existing accrued benefits and reasonable expectations on which workers have relied.

3.2 – Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed (one additional point)

In some cases, especially under ‘independent contractor’ classifications, workers carry a disproportionate amount of risk for engaging in a contract with the service user. They may be liable for any damage arising in the course of their work, and they may be prevented by unfair clauses from seeking legal redress for grievances. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate that risks and liability of engaging in the work is shared between parties.

Regardless of how the the contractual status of the worker is classified, the platform must satisfy BOTH of the following:

- Takes appropriate steps to ensure that the contract does not include clauses which exclude liability for negligence nor unreasonably exempt the platform from liability for working conditions.
- Takes appropriate steps to ensure that the contract does not include clauses which prevent workers from effectively seeking redress for grievances which arise from the working relationship.

Principle 4: Fair Management

4.1 Provides due process for decisions affecting workers (one point)

Platform workers can experience arbitrary deactivation; being barred from accessing the platform without explanation, and potentially losing their income. Workers may be subject to other penalties or disciplinary decisions without the ability to contact the service user or the platform to challenge or appeal them if they believe they are unfair. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate an avenue for workers to meaningfully appeal disciplinary actions.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- There is a channel for workers to communicate with a human representative of the platform. This channel is documented in a contract and available on the platform interface. Platforms should respond to workers within a reasonable timeframe.
- There is a process for workers to meaningfully appeal low ratings, non-payment, payment issues, deactivations, and other penalties and disciplinary actions. This process is documented in a contract and available on the platform interface⁴².
- In the case of deactivations, the appeals process must

be available to workers who no longer have access to the platform.

- Workers are not disadvantaged for voicing concerns or appealing disciplinary actions.

4.2 – Provides equity in the management process (one additional point)

The majority of platforms do not actively discriminate against particular groups of workers. However, they may inadvertently exacerbate already existing inequalities in their design and management. For example, there is a lot of gender segregation between different types of platform work. To achieve this point, platforms must show not only that they have policies against discrimination, but also that they seek to remove barriers for disadvantaged groups, and promote inclusion.

Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following:

- There is a policy which ensures the platform does not discriminate on grounds such as race, social origin, caste, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sex, gender identity and expression, disability, religion or belief, age or any other status.
- Where persons from a disadvantaged group (such as women) are significantly under-represented among a pool of workers, it seeks to identify and remove barriers to access by persons from that group.
- It takes practical measures to promote equality of opportunity for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, disability, and religion or belief.
- If algorithms are used to determine access to work or remuneration or the type of work and pay scales available to workers seeking to use the platform, these are transparent and do not result in inequitable outcomes for workers from historically or currently disadvantaged groups.
- It has mechanisms to reduce the risk of users discriminating against workers from disadvantaged groups in accessing and carrying out work.
- It takes practical measures to promote equality of opportunity for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, disability, and religion or belief.
- If algorithms are used to determine access to work or remuneration, these are transparent and do not result

in inequitable outcomes for workers from historically or currently disadvantaged groups.

- It has mechanisms to reduce the risk of users discriminating against workers from disadvantaged groups in accessing and carrying out work.

Principle 5: Fair Representation

5.1 Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice (one point)

Freedom of association is a fundamental right for all workers, and enshrined in the constitution of the International Labour Organisation, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right for workers to organise, collectively express their wishes – and importantly – be listened to, is an important prerequisite for fair working conditions.

However, rates of organisation amongst platform workers remain low. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that the conditions are in place to encourage the expression of collective worker voice. Whether or not platforms set the terms on which workers are retained by service users, platforms must demonstrate that they have taken appropriate steps to ensure that workers are informed of their rights (and have mechanisms in place to help protect those rights) and that workers are directed to appropriate collective bodies or trade unions.

Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following:

- There is a documented mechanism for the expression of collective worker voice.
- There is a formal policy of willingness to recognise or bargain with, a collective body of workers or trade union that is clearly communicated to all workers⁴³.
- Freedom of association is not inhibited, and workers are not disadvantaged in any way for communicating their concerns, wishes, and demands to the platform⁴⁴.

5.2 Supports democratic governance (one additional point)

While rates of organisation remain low, platform workers' associations are emerging in many sectors and countries. We are also seeing a growing number of cooperative worker-owned platforms. To realise fair representation, workers must have a say in the conditions of their work. This could be through a democratically governed cooperative model, a formally recognised union, or the ability to undertake collective bargaining with the platform.

The platform must satisfy at least ONE of the following:

1. Workers play a meaningful role in governing it.
2. It publicly and formally recognises an independent collective body of workers, an elected works council, or trade union.
3. It seeks to implement meaningful mechanisms for collective representation or bargaining.

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35 The ILO defines minimum wage as the “minimum amount of remuneration that an employer is required to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which cannot be reduced by collective agreement or an individual contract.” Minimum wage laws protect workers from unduly low pay and help them attain a minimum standard of living. The ILO’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 C135 sets the conditions and requirements of establishing minimum wages and calls upon all ratifying countries to act in accordance. Minimum wage laws exist in more than 90 percent of the ILO member states.

36 In addition to direct working hours where workers complete tasks, they also spend time performing unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as waiting for delivery orders at restaurants and traveling between jobs. These indirect working hours are also considered part of active hours as workers give this time to the platform. Thus, ‘active hours’ include both direct and indirect working hours.

37 In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers, the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local minimum wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost.

38 Where a living wage does not exist, Fairwork will use the Global Living Wage Coalition’s Anker Methodology to estimate one.

39 In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers, the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local living wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost data evidencing all workers earn a minimum wage after costs.

40 Where the platform directly engages the worker, the starting point is the ILO’s Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (C155). This stipulates that employers shall be required “so far as is reasonably practicable, the workplaces, machinery, equipment, and processes under their control are safe and without health risk”, and that “where necessary, adequate protective clothing and protective equipment [should be provided] to prevent, so far as is reasonably practicable, risk of accidents or adverse effects on health.”

41 The ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC 2006), Reg. 2.1, and the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (C189), Articles 7 and 15, serve as helpful guiding examples of adequate provisions in workers’ terms and conditions, as well as worker access to those terms and conditions.

42 Workers should have the option of escalating grievances that have not been satisfactorily addressed and, in the case of automated decisions, should have the option of escalating them for human mediation.

43 For example, “[the platform] will support any effort by its workers to organise or form a trade union collectively. Collective bargaining through trade unions can often bring about more favourable working conditions.”

44 See ILO (2021) World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work International Labour Office

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
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Conflict of interest statement

None of the researchers have any connection with any of the platforms and the work undertaken received no funding or support in kind from any platform or any other company, and we declare that there is no conflict of interest.



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