



**INDEBTEDNESS AND PRECARIOUSNESS:
A PORTRAIT OF PLATFORM WORK IN BRAZIL**

***FAIRWORK
BRAZIL
RATINGS
2025***





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THE FAIRWORK PROJECT

Executive Summary

In 2022, the Fairwork Project published its first research report on fair work and platform companies in Brazil. The platforms evaluated at that time were iFood, 99, Uber, GetNinjas, Rappi, and Uber Eats. The study revealed the difficulties in complying with the basic principles that define “fair work,” which are related to pay, working conditions, contracts, management, and representation.

The second Fairwork report in Brazil, analysing 10 platforms—99, Americanas Entrega Flash, AppJusto, GetNinjas, iFood, Lalamove, Loggi, Parafuzo, Rappi, and Uber—was published in 2023. In this study, most platforms scored no points. Only three of the 10 platforms—AppJusto, iFood, and Parafuzo—scored at least one point. Notably, only AppJusto achieved three points. More than three years after the first assessment, which revealed a significant distance between these companies and the concept of fair work, one might ask: have platform companies made changes, and are they able to guarantee fair work?

The Fairwork Project’s underpinning assumption is that digital platforms must ensure fair working conditions, regardless of their operating model. Following this principle, the companies described in this report were evaluated according to the five Fairwork principles, concerning pay, working conditions, contracts, management, and representation. As in the two previous reports, the methodology applied included desk research, interviews with workers, and meetings with company representatives. After analysing the collected data, the platforms are evaluated in order to verify their compliance or non-compliance with the principles established by Fairwork.

This research study was carried out between August 2023 and August 2025 by a team led by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, the University of Brasília, and the Federal University of Paraná. This report presents the results of the third Fairwork scoring in the country, analysing 10 platforms: 99, Americanas-Ame Flash, iFood, Lalamove, Loggi, Parafuzo, Rappi, Uber, InDrive, and Superprof. In this round, the InDrive and Superprof platforms each earned one point for the first principle of Fair Pay, as it could be confirmed that workers are assured of at least the minimum wage, after work-related costs are accounted for. No platform provided evidence of compliance with the other four Fairwork principles.

The results of the evaluation indicate that the deficit of fair work present in platform companies persists due to a combination of low pay, a lack of contractual guarantees, high risks, arbitrary deactivation, and opaque management processes, as well as adverse reactions regarding collective organisation. These factors reinforce the vulnerability of workers in the face of the companies’ lack of responsibility.

SCORES

FAIRWORK BRAZIL 2025



Minimum standards
of fair work

InDrive	1/10	● ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Superprof	1/10	● ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
99	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Ame Flash	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
iFood	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Lalamove	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Loggi	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Parafuzo	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Rappi	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Uber	0/10	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

The breakdown of scores for individual platforms is available at: [FAIR.WORK/BRAZIL](https://www.fair.work/brazil)

KEY FINDINGS



FAIR PAY

To score this point, platforms must demonstrate that labour-related costs do not reduce a worker's earnings below a certain threshold. InDrive and Superprof both achieved a point on the first threshold of this principle, as there was evidence that workers are paid an hourly rate above the minimum wage after work-related costs are considered. Both platforms guarantee full and timely payments and provide workers with the option to set their own prices for services. No platform met the criteria for the second threshold, which requires workers to earn at least the equivalent of the local living wage after costs.



FAIR CONDITIONS


To score on this principle, platforms must demonstrate an awareness of work-related risks and take basic steps to mitigate them. They must also minimise the risk of illness and injury, even after all basic measures have been taken. No platform provided sufficient evidence to be awarded a score on either of this principle's two thresholds. It can be inferred from the evidence gathered that these companies consistently fail to ensure safety and social protection, instead transferring risks to their workers. Platforms could not show that their existing policies, such as insurance or emergency buttons, are adequate or accessible, while mechanisms that pressure workers to increase their productivity appear to worsen their vulnerabilities.



FAIR CONTRACTS

To score on this principle, a platform must demonstrate that workers are able to understand, agree to, and access the terms and conditions of their work at all times, and that they have legal recourse if the other party breaches these conditions. Although most of the contracts of the platforms scored in this report are easily accessible, no platform scored a point for the first threshold of this principle due to conflict with other standards assessed. Neither could we award the second point to any of these platforms, since we could not find evidence that contracts, for the most part, do not contain abusive clauses, do not exempt platforms from liability, have timely notification of contractual terms, comply with local data protection regulations and are transparent in relation to the operation of the algorithm.





FAIR MANAGEMENT

To receive this point, platforms must demonstrate a path for workers to communicate with the platform and to meaningfully appeal disciplinary actions. For the second threshold, platforms must show not only that they have anti-discrimination policies, but also that they seek to remove barriers for disadvantaged groups and promote inclusion. No platform has provided evidence that it complies with the criteria listed in this principle's two points. In general, communication and support channels were identified, with a prevalence of chatbots. However, workers experienced difficulties using the platform when their accounts were blocked, and there was a lack of evidence of anti-discrimination policies.



FAIR REPRESENTATION

To achieve the first point, platforms should ensure that conditions are in place to encourage the expression of workers' collective voice, and workers should not be disadvantaged when raising concerns about the conditions of their work. or the second point, there should be evidence of effective engagement with workers' bodies, such as collective bargaining. None of the platforms assessed were able to provide evidence that they comply with either of the two points of this principle.

EDITORIAL

Fair work is receding

Previous reports from Fairwork Brazil have already presented data indicating an increase in labour exploitation by digital platforms, and a normalisation of the broad lack of responsibility of companies concerning any damage that may occur to the worker. Evidence gathered in this report suggests a lack of basic labour and social rights. There are also ways to intensify work control through algorithmic control, gamification, and rating systems, which accelerate and increase work-related risks. This year's report finds a deepening of these processes, and a transformation in terms of its interrelations with the gender debate, with informality, and with the logic of indebtedness.

Regarding gender, this study finds a significant worsening of reports of violence suffered by workers, especially by women. As stated by one worker interviewed for this study: "There is a lot of harassment. I've witnessed this a lot, I report it and then the platform simply says it will notify the user, and I then have no response from it". It is important to highlight that the concept of violence transcends physical aggression and includes discrimination, and all forms that harm human dignity. Any condition that compromises human subjectivity or its capacities for material reproduction is also a form of violence. In the case of platforms, what this study shows is the normalisation of physical and symbolic violence, which has become part of workers' daily realities.

Regarding the dimensions of informality, it was possible to identify the practice of multi-apping, where workers work on multiple platforms, perhaps even alternating between car and motorcycle use. Workers do this for several reasons. The first is an attempt to circumvent the algorithm and the very low remuneration offered by companies. Workers might also multiapp in order to continue working while recovering from an accident or during pregnancy. Some workers reported that when they don't feel well while driving a motorcycle, either because they have been in an accident or because they experience body pain due to the position or weight of the thermal bag on the motorcycle, they may alternate its use with that of a car. This shows that workers are able to use diversified survival strategies and alternatives to meet the demands of this work. The damage that this work brings to their health in the medium and long term has been the subject of investigation in the country¹.

A strategy that has been increasingly used by platform companies is to position themselves as a financial provider, offering loans to workers, entangling them in a logic of indebtedness. In some cases, workers need to pay a fee to access their full compensation. When fees and deductions (for instance, for incomplete orders) are charged, this can generate a negative balance. According to some platforms, fees serve to cover the costs of maintaining the apps and benefits for workers. We were able to identify the use of third-party companies by some platforms to manage the payment of workers, though this complexification in payment models and systems



has not reduced the problems related to delays or undue payments. We found stronger evidence of complexification of indebtedness in the case of bikers, riders and drivers, for example. In multiple large urban centres, these workers are led to rent bicycles, cars or motorcycles, creating financial dependence during their work with the rental company.

According to the workers we interviewed for this study, they start the day with a negative balance in their platform account due to the rental of a car or motorcycle. These rental companies are independent entities, but also partners of the platforms to the extent that they authorise the debit from the worker's account.

Workers also reported to us that when orders are lost (due to accidents or theft, for example), they end up being charged, generating another way to exacerbate the debt. To the extent that the delivery's earnings do not exceed this rate due to the worker's inability to work on the day they rented the vehicle, this results in a debt for the worker.

The informal, unregulated work, devoid of social protection, which is characteristic of the work on the digital platforms assessed in this report, imposes daily challenges and harms onto workers. Digital platform workers face precarious conditions and rights violations, including low pay, which often does not guarantee their own subsistence or that of their families, the constant risk of accidents and deaths in traffic, robberies, moral and sexual harassment suffered especially by women, as well as other forms of discrimination. By transferring the full burden of the activity to those who work, platforms exempt themselves from any responsibility.



COUNTRY CONTEXT

While the world advances in the regulatory debate, Brazil regresses

The context in which this research study was carried out is quite different from the contexts of the previous reports, from 2021 and 2023. First, the change in the Federal Government in 2022 established a greater space for discussion concerning regulation of work on digital platforms. In addition to the creation of a tripartite working group in 2023 to debate this topic, numerous hearings and political articulations were held at the federal and local levels. Unfortunately, despite these initiatives, little progress has been made in the field of regulation and protective legislation for workers. Concomitantly, there was an important debate in the legal sphere, with a concerning performance by the Federal Supreme Court in its decisions regarding the Labour Courts on this subject.

Internationally, there has been progress in the regulatory debate, particularly in the European Union, which has approved a Directive highlighting the need to presume the existence of an employment relationship. The Directive also establishes specific rights related to algorithmic management and transparency, and its effective implementation in national legislation. Internationally, in June 2025, at its 113th Conference in Geneva, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) presented a resolution to create an international convention on Decent Work in the Platform Economy. The approved document outlines recommendations and obligations for member states², representing an advance in the rights of platform workers.

In Brazil, on the other hand, little or no progress has been made in the regulatory field for digital platform workers. Indeed, this report shows that this deficit is further increasing the precariousness of platform work, opening up space for illness, indebtedness, and risks to workers.

One major difference between this report and the previous two is that the Brazilian economy appears to have finally recovered from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly in relation to the labour market. According to the IBGE³, in May 2025, Brazil's unemployment rate was 6.2%, the lowest rate since 2012. According to the National Statistics Office's (IBGE) National Household Sample Survey (PNAD), in 2022, 778,000 people carried out the activity of passenger transport through apps as their main work activity, 589,000 worked in food and goods delivery apps, and 197,000 in general on professional services apps⁴.




Platform work not only remains precarious but has also come to rely on strategies to deepen exploitation and precariousness. Data from the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) in 2022⁵ reveals that drivers on digital platforms are working more hours to obtain the same income or even less than in previous years. There is also evidence that platform workers have contributed less to social security, that average earnings may have decreased, and that there has been an increase in “over-education”, as workers tend to have more years of training than expected in this activity. Thus, we see that, although unemployment has decreased in recent years, there are still structural problems in working conditions.

On March 31 and April 1 2025, delivery workers stopped their activities on digital platforms in protest for better working condition⁶. Mainly working for iFood, the main delivery company operating in Brazil, they demanded an increase of the minimum rate from R\$ 6.50 to R\$ 10.00 per delivery, an increase in the payment for the additional kilometer from R\$ 1.50 to R\$ 2.50, a limit on the radius for bicycle deliveries of up to 3 km per order, and full payment of rides when workers do multiple orders in one ride⁷. As a result, progressive parliamentarians have endeavoured to listen to the agendas of workers, representatives of movements, researchers and legal experts through public hearings. However, there is still a long way to go to achieve serious and effective regulation of platform work. In the Brazilian context, it is common for agendas to be co-opted by corporate representatives, reducing them to a ‘regularisation’ of lack of rights. For this reason, it is necessary for regulators to be attentive to the demands of the working masses, so that they can reflect on real improvements for workers.

At a time of intense debates in the National Congress and the Federal Supreme Court on the regulation of platform work (see next section), the president of iFood, Diego Barreto, invited the minister of the Federal Supreme Court, Luís Roberto Barroso, to a charity dinner at his residence. The purpose of the dinner was for the company to commit to the payment of scholarships for young black people who wish to enter the judiciary⁸, in contradiction to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the company’s delivery workers are young black and brown people and do not have access to basic working conditions. Soon after, on July 3 2025, the minister gave an interview to one of the most prominent Brazilian newspapers, *Folha de S. Paulo*⁹, stating that “the excess of protection [in the current labour legislation] does not protect the worker”, denying the need to recognise the employment relationship of drivers and delivery workers.

Despite little progress in terms of regulation, in recent years it has been possible to verify the increase of new platform workers associations, collectives and unions in all regions of the country. In addition, national bodies have been created, such as ANEA, the National Association of App Delivery Workers. A diverse set of leaders has been forged over the years, and these have been able to further highlight their political-union demands. In this process, another relevant highlight is the emergence of women’s collectives and associations.



Latin America’s Regulatory Context: A Fragmented Debate

Regulatory interest in addressing the realities of the platform economy extends beyond Brazil to numerous Latin American countries, with some making significant progress in establishing national regulatory regimes (see Table 1). As shown in the table, different regulations address the issue of platform work in various ways. Some resolve the debate over the dependency of workers on both delivery and ride-hailing platforms, while others officially codify the narrative of independent work by law. Additionally, some regulations clearly outline the need for platforms to establish a legal presence in the country, while others do not address this topic. Lastly, the table reveals a fragmented debate where workers’ associations have different interpretations of what regulation of the platform economy should look like.

Table 1. Platform Regulations in Latin America

Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
Law No. 20,396 (2025)	Uruguay	Yes	<p>Origin of the initiative: Ministry of Labour and Social Security.</p> <p>Dependency/autonomy of working people: It doesn’t resolve the issue. It allows for dependent and independent contracts.</p> <p>Worker support: The trade union center (PIT-CNT) has expressed its rejection.</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Common rights:</u> Transparency of algorithms and monitoring systems; the right to an explanation; the right to the intangibility of digital reputation and data portability; terms and conditions must be transparent, concise, and easily accessible.</p> <p><u>Platform obligations:</u> Risk assessment and preventive measures, as well as worker training. Companies are not required to establish a legal entity in the country. However, disputes between workers living in Uruguay and platforms must be submitted to national courts.</p> <p><u>Rights of dependent workers:</u> 48-hour weekly work limit; minimum wage.</p> <p><u>Rights of independent workers:</u> Occupational accidents and diseases; social security benefits (simplified tax regime); freedom of association and collective bargaining.</p>

Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
Preliminary draft “Statute of workers on on-demand digital platforms”	Argentina	No	<p>Origin of the initiative: Ministry of Labour and Social Security.</p> <p>Dependence/autonomy of workers: It doesn’t resolve the issue. It allows for dependent and independent contracts.</p> <p>Worker support: Split positions. The Peronist and left-wing parties were more aligned toward recognising the employment relationship, while the right-wing parties leaned toward a more corporate approach (maintaining independent work).</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Workers’ rights:</u> occupational accidents and occupational diseases; social security benefits, right to information and digital reputation, 48-hour weekly work limit; minimum wage, Christmas bonus, vacation, leave, compensation.</p> <p><u>Platform obligations:</u> Principle of equality and non-discrimination, a reserve fund for illness or accidents, provision of safety and personal protection equipment (not including work tools), and occupational hazard insurance. Companies are not required to establish a legal entity in the country.</p>
Bill "Regulating work in digital mobility and home delivery platform companies".	Paraguay	In process	<p>Origin of the initiative: Legislative power</p> <p>Dependency/autonomy of workers: The employment relationship remains unresolved, resulting in a generic category of individuals providing mobility and delivery platform services.</p> <p>Worker support: Delivery and transportation workers participated in the debate, with split positions on the project, particularly on the job status discussions.</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Platform obligations:</u> A platform must establish a legal entity in the country and a physical space to serve workers. It is mandatory to establish identity verification mechanisms for all individuals in the platform ecosystem. It is compulsory to develop anti-discrimination measures on the platform, as well as measures for protecting personal data.</p> <p><u>Workers’ rights:</u> A Permanent Working Group is established where workers can participate, and guarantees are established against discrimination. It also establishes a guarantee that workers carry out their activities in working conditions that prevent occupational hazards and ensure health.</p>



Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
Law 2466 of 2025 Congress of the Republic of Colombia	Colombia	Yes	<p>Origin of the initiative: Ministry of Labour (Executive) and Legislative Power.</p> <p>Dependence/autonomy of workers: It doesn't solve the problem. It allows workers to choose between being employees and independent contractors at their discretion. The reform refers to digital delivery platform workers. It doesn't include other sectors of the platform economy (such as transportation and cloud work) although it includes a specific chapter for teleworking.</p> <p>Support for working people: Mixed reactions. Acceptance from some unions that supported the project's development, and opposition from some delivery organisations.</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem:</p> <p><u>Platform obligations</u></p> <p>Clearly inform employees about the scope of the work through the digital delivery platform or the technological tool to which they have access. Notice of contract modification prior to its entry into force, right to file complaints, and verification. Enterprises must register workers with the Ministry of Labour and report on the use of automated systems for managing and distributing tasks.</p> <p><u>Workers' rights</u></p> <p>Social Security: For dependent workers, payments are established according to the comprehensive social security system, in the proportions defined by current regulations. For independent workers, a shared contribution system is established between the company and the worker. The company must ensure coverage for occupational risk.</p>
Bill No. 018 "Law that recognises labour benefits for workers who provide delivery, courier, and mobility services through digital platforms."	Peru	In process	<p>Origin of Initiative: Congress of the Republic.</p> <p>Dependency/Autonomy of workers: Those who work over 4 hours per day or 20 hours per week are considered dependent workers.</p> <p>Worker support: The Trade Union Central (CATP) showed its support.</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem:</p> <p><u>Workers' rights:</u> A 48-hour work week with a 30-minute break is established. Overtime is considered if the established time is exceeded. Contracts are awarded, and accident, disability, and death insurance, as well as health insurance, are provided. Labour inspections are carried out by the SUNAFIL.</p> <p><u>Platform obligations:</u> Creation of a registry of workers on delivery, transportation, and logistics platforms. Delivery and periodic renewal of personal protective equipment. Establishment of a system for handling complaints and reporting of acts of sexual harassment and/or discrimination. Respect for freedom of association. Issuance of employment certificates.</p>



Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
PLP 12/2024 https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=2419243&fichaAmigavel=nao	Brazil	In process	<p>Origin of Initiative: Federal government.</p> <p>Dependency/Autonomy of workers: Does not resolve. Allows for dependent and independent contracts.</p> <p>Worker support: The bill arose from a dispute between government, business, and labour representatives. Organisations such as the Brazilian Association of Labour Studies (ABET) and the Public Ministry of Labour (MPT) point to potential unconstitutionality and rights violations in the bill.</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: Although the PLP (Complementary Bill) recognises the category of "self-employed platform worker," which applies to app-based drivers, the bill does not establish an employment relationship along the lines of the CLT (Consolidation of Labour Laws) between drivers and platform companies. The proposal does not specify the requirement for the company to have its formal headquarters in Brazil in order to operate.</p> <p><u>Workers' rights:</u> It limits the working day to 12 hours; it includes the definition of a minimum wage per kilometre travelled; it establishes Social Security contributions, with 8% of the minimum income being paid by the worker and 20% by the platform.</p> <p><u>Obligations of companies:</u> It focuses exclusively on ride-hailing app drivers and does not cover delivery drivers or motorcyclists; it establishes mandatory union representation mechanisms for collective bargaining, reducing work-related risks, and eliminating all forms of discrimination, violence, and harassment at work.</p>
Law 21.431 https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1173544	Chile	Approved	<p>Origin of the initiative: Legislative power.</p> <p>Dependency/Autonomy of working people: Allows contracts to be dependent and independent.</p> <p>Support for workers: The project emerged from various legislative initiatives presented by political parties and from rounds of negotiations and presentations by platform companies.</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem:</p> <p>This law regulates the relationships between digital platform workers and digital platform companies providing services in the country.</p> <p><u>Workers rights</u></p> <p>The use of automated decision-making mechanisms for discrimination is prohibited. Workers must have access to training and protective equipment. Collective rights of workers are also established.</p> <p><u>Obligation of companies</u></p> <p>The platform has a duty to protect workers, including regulating the length of the workday, ensuring fair compensation or fees, and guaranteeing access to the social security system. Workers have the right to disconnect and must receive prior notice of contract termination. The company is also required to provide information about the service offered. A basis for calculating legal severance pay in the event of dismissal is also established.</p>



Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
<p>Bill to Regulate the Employment Relationship of Workers with Digital Platform Companies</p> <p>https://www.ctslab.org/2025/08/25/panorama-de-la-legislacion-del-trabajo-en-plataformas-digitales-en-ecuador/</p>	Ecuador	In the legislative process (report for the second plenary debate)	<p>Origin of the initiative: Legislative power.</p> <p>Dependence/autonomy of workers: Recognises delivery work mediated by digital platforms as a form of dependent work recognised by the Labour Code.</p> <p>Worker support: In earlier stages of this bill, the platform workers' collective FRENAPP expressed its opposition to the creation of two categories of workers—dependent and independent—and advocated for the general recognition of platform workers. The collective “Unión de trabajadores de plataformas Quito” also rejected the bill, arguing that it could “destroy jobs.”</p> <p>Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem:</p> <p>The original initiative was merged with two other bills, modifying the initial proposal. The report for the committee's second debate includes:</p> <p>Common rights: establishment of a dependency relationship, right to disconnection, right to free association.</p> <p>Obligations of companies: Designation of an official channel for worker complaints and objections, establishment of a physical office, maintenance of an updated worker database, provision of ongoing training for workers, user awareness, provision of work implements free of charge, and availability of information regarding evaluations by users and businesses.</p> <p>Workers' rights: social security and all rights recognised to employees.</p> <p>Use: In December 2024, a party introduced a bill titled “Organic Law for the Protection of Digital Service Platform Workers.” This bill proposes mandatory employment contracts between workers and companies, recognising the employment relationship. Additionally, it proposes the establishment of a physical office and a virtual channel, the provision of supplies and free internet access, as well as life insurance. The bill has not been assigned to any committee, so its public debate has not yet begun.</p>

Companies assessed and working conditions

The Fairwork Brazil team assessed 10 digital labour platforms in multiple sectors, including ride-hailing, delivery, logistics and domestic services. Among the companies scored by Fairwork Brazil, Ame Flash, which currently operates under the name Americanas Entrega Flash, presents itself as a fast delivery platform linked to the Brazilian group Americanas S.A. The platform was created as a logistics arm to speed up the company's deliveries, a crucial sector for digital retail. Americanas S.A.'s 2021 annual report states that the company has more than 20,000 registered motorcyclists and a total of 33,103 delivery workers in its base. However, in early 2023, the Americanas group filed one of the largest requests for judicial reorganisation in the history of Brazil, reporting debts that exceed R\$ 40 billion¹¹. The crisis was triggered by the revealing of “accounting inconsistencies”, which generated deep distrust in the market and impacted its entire operation, including the relationship of dependence with the thousands of employees and delivery workers registered on the delivery platform.

Another delivery company scored is Ifood. Although Ifood defines itself as a Brazilian technology organization specializing in online delivery, since 2022 the company has been owned by the Dutch subsidiary of the Naspers group, Prosus, an investment holding company in technology companies with South African capital. Founded in 2011, the company invests in market delivery and fintech, operates in more than 1,500 cities throughout Brazil, and claims to have 400,000 active delivery workers and more than 55 million customers, in addition to moving 0.55% of the Brazilian GDP¹². In addition to belonging to the select group of unicorns, with an appraisal value of more than US\$ 1 billion, IFood currently controls 83% of the Brazilian meal delivery market¹³. With the acquisition of 33.3% of the shares that belonged to Just Eat Holding Limited, Prosus became the sole shareholder of iFood¹⁴. In 2025, Prosus also started to acquire Just Eat Takeaway, which operates in 17 countries, with a concentration in European markets¹⁵.

Ifood and Ame Flash have adopted a logistics operator model¹⁶, recruiting outsourced workers to manage and engage with delivery workers. “Logistics Operators” are companies hired by iFood to manage and execute the delivery service: they organise the delivery workers, set up schedules and are responsible for paying the workers¹⁷.

Still in the delivery business, Lalamove is a platform founded in Hong Kong in 2013, which has since expanded across several continents and started operating in Brazil in 2019. In 2023, Lalamove doubled in size for the fourth consecutive year¹⁸ and currently operates more than 1 million rides per month in 17 Brazilian cities¹⁹. The number of orders placed using the platform has grown, on average, 155% per year since its launch in Brazil²⁰.

Another company in the delivery business is Rappi, which operates in nine countries in Latin America. The firm says it was created as a way to connect small businesses or ‘neighborhood stores’ with consumers in the region²¹. In Brazil, the platform company started operations in 2017 and is present today in about 100 Brazilian cities²². The company has an investment plan of R\$ 1.4 billion in the Brazilian

As an effort to participate in the ongoing International Labour Organisation (ILO) debates towards a platform regulation, in April 2025, the Latin American countries involved in the Fairwork project launched the “Declaración de Asunción”, a collective statement issued by Fairwork Latin American researchers as well civil society organisations in the region and globally, to defend the fundamental rights of workers on digital platforms in Latin America. It was developed collaboratively and focuses on ensuring occupational health and safety, algorithmic transparency, data protection, fair remuneration and dispute resolution mechanisms; all from a Latin American perspective¹⁰.



operation until 2028, with the objective of increasing the number of partners and strengthening its presence in strategic municipalities²³.

This study also assessed the Brazilian company Loggi, created in 2013. The platform company stands out for delivering more than 1 million packages per day, having more than 1,500 collection and distribution points, in addition to having more than 200,000 delivery partners²⁴. With contributions from important investors such as SoftBank, Microsoft, GGV Capital, Monashees, Kaszkek, among others, in 2019, Loggi became part of the unicorn group in Brazil, with a valuation of more than one billion dollars²⁵. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the company recently partnered with Uber, with a view to further expanding its operations in the national logistics sector²⁶.

Another novelty in this year's report is the scoring of an education platform. Created in France, Superprof operates as a global marketplace connecting teachers and students for private lessons. Known as the "Airbnb of education", the company does not employ teachers with an employment relationship, advertising that it works as a "bridge" that facilitates the search and contact for classes that can take place in person or online, covering more than a thousand subjects, from school learning support to languages, arts and sports. In 2023, Superprof celebrated its first decade of existence, with a global community exceeding 24 million registered teachers and 35 million students in 42 countries. At the Brazilian level, data from 2018 point to thousands of accesses per day, with an average annual growth of 115.48%, with the adhesion of 300 new teachers each day in Brazil at the time. The platform claims to have millions of teachers available in Brazil, reflecting its consolidated presence in the national market for private lessons.



As for individual urban mobility companies, Uber, 99 and Indrive were evaluated for this study. Founded in 2009, Uber is an American company that has expanded its service offering and expanded its operations globally. In this context, the company offers several types of mobility services, including delivery intermediation, among others. Uber is present in more than 70 countries and has more than 8 million active drivers/delivery partners and 171 million active users. In Brazil, the company's operation began in 2014 in Rio de Janeiro, with 125 million Brazilians having already used the Uber app at least once²⁷. Brazil has the largest number of drivers registered in the application worldwide, with 1.4 million. It is worth mentioning that, in 2024, the company reported a profit of R\$1.6 billion, exceeding the market's forecast. Notably, this growth was driven by Latin America, particularly Brazil, as well as India.

99 is a platform founded in 2012 in Brazil, acquired by China's Didi Chuxing in 2018, and which reached, in 2024, a record of 50 million users and 1.5 million drivers. In addition to the transport service provided through the 99 App, the platform also offers services such as digital accounts (99 Pay), item delivery and receipt (99 Entrega), and loans (99 Loans). The various services offered by the platform have contributed to its growth, including the digital account service (99 Pay), which, just one year after its launch, achieved a growth rate of 1,640%.

InDrive is a transport company originally from Russia, established in 2012. The name is an abbreviation for "Independent Driver", associating the activity with the fact that the value of the trip can be negotiated between drivers and passengers. In 2021, the company achieved unicorn status, and today it is available in 48 countries, with 280 million apps installed. In Brazil, the company's presence dates back to 2018 and offers travel services around the city, between cities, deliveries, B2B deliveries and freight. In Brazil it has 15 million users and 43 million app downloads, according to data from December 2024 available on the company's website.

Finally, we evaluated a domestic service platform named Parafuzo, founded in 2014. Self-described as the "largest platform for domestic services in Brazil", Parafuzo has thousands of autonomous professionals who perform services that can range from simple cleaning of a house to furniture assembly²⁸. The company is currently present in 20 states and the Federal District, is available in more than 240 Brazilian cities, and accounts for more than 1.5 million services performed each year²⁹. It is worth noting that the company's revenue in 2016 was R\$13 million; there is no information available about the current revenue.





LEGAL CONTEXT

The regulation of platform work in Brazil: the building of a second-line worker model

In the 2022 presidential campaign, the then-candidate and now president Luís Inácio Lula da Silva presented, among his government proposals³⁰, the “negotiation of rights for app workers”, with “fair remuneration and working hours”, envisioning a process of alignment with the model adopted in Spain with the Riders Law³¹. In May 2023, a Tripartite Working Group was created, within the scope of the Ministry of Labour, with the purpose of preparing proposals for “regulation of the activities of provision of services, transport of goods, transport of people and other activities carried out through technological platforms”, having 150 days to present its results. The group comprised 15 components of the government, workers, and companies, with a diverse composition, including traditional unions and associations that generally represent workers and companies.

The Federal Government’s original assumptions contained two misconceptions that already foreshadowed the challenges of the working group: the generic intention of regulating platform work, without consideration of the sectors in which the platforms operate, and the idea of seeking consensus, which had already prevented the regulation of workers as employees of the companies.

The workers’ representatives presented a proposal³² stating that the regulation should not be treated generically, as the companies are not in the technology sector, but rather each one operates in a different economic sector. The workers’ group demanded multiple labour rights, including collective bargaining and union rights, flexibility in defining shifts and schedules, a stable employment relationship for habitual workers, autonomy for casual workers, and rules governing working hours, in addition to a minimum wage and access to social security. Companies, on the other hand, wanted legal guarantees for their operations, the characterisation of workers as self-employed and the recognition of some basic rights, such as health and safety measures, a wage floor and a differentiated employer’s contribution to social security.

Due to difficulties related to treating “platform work” in a generic way, the Government formed two subgroups to separately deal with the regulation of work for ride-hailing and delivery platforms.

The working group ended without a final report and was only able, in March 2024, months after its closure, to present a bill (PLP 12/2024) to regulate work on ride-hailing transport platforms. The bill’s launch took place in a festive ceremony³³, with workers’ representatives, companies and President Lula himself in attendance, who celebrated the birth of “a new model in the world of work³⁴.”



The bill 12/2024 establishes an intermediate legal figure between a self-employed worker and employee, excluding the possibility of an employment relationship and restricting full autonomy. Thus, an atypical category was created, without the guarantees of formal employment or the freedom of self-employment. The proposal is similar to Proposition 22,³⁵ approved in California in 2020, which establishes its own regulation parameters for platform drivers.

The definition of autonomy is based on fragile elements: the worker’s ability to set working hours, the absence of exclusivity, and the absence of mandatory working hours. Such elements, in isolation, do not constitute an autonomous relationship, as they are compatible with other forms of subordination, such as remote work. The proposal omits central aspects of digital labour dynamics, such as the right to refuse rides and the definition of remuneration criteria. Therefore, the contractual asymmetry between the parties remains.

On the other hand, it legitimises typical powers of subordination used by companies while excluding the employment relationship, including: imposition of rules, application of sanctions, real-time monitoring, constant evaluations, offer of courses, and granting of incentives. Thus, the bill creates a subordinate worker without a formal employment and, mainly, without labour rights.

The bill allows a working day of up to 12 hours, without ensuring breaks or rests. There is no reference to mechanisms to control working hours or protect workers’ health. There is no mention of national data protection regulation (LGPD), algorithms, or artificial intelligence, even though such instruments made up the core of the relationship between platform and driver.

There is a provision for principles such as transparency, risk prevention and the right to collective organisation, but without provision for effective guarantee instruments. For example, there is no union access to automated systems, as provided for in the EU Directive. The promise of payment of a minimum amount per hour is illusory, as it only considers the time between acceptance and the end of the ride. Displacements and waiting periods are disregarded, requiring the worker to work long hours to reach the minimum foreseen.

The bill was acclaimed by digital platforms³⁶ but poorly received by most drivers, who sought the presentation of an alternative bill by a federal deputy from the right-wing field that would give them greater autonomy (PL 536/2024). The bill received the support of the Trade Union Centrals³⁷.



Regarding platform delivery workers, they sought left-wing deputies to present a bill (PL 2479/2025),³⁸ which seeks to guarantee “a minimum amount of remuneration for services of workers on digital delivery platforms and motorcycle taxi drivers, establishes transparency rules, creates an obligation to provide accident insurance”. However, the bill overlooks the issue of the employment relationship and instead focuses on circumstantial issues and the specific demands of the workers.

Finally, in July 2025, a new bill (PLP 152/2025) was presented, which intends to replace the PLP 12 presented by the Government and cover both drivers and delivery workers, not providing for the basic right to collective bargaining, nor guaranteeing minimum wage (as provided for in the previous bill presented by Lula), and classifying workers as self-employed.

The President of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) created, in July, a special commission to address the issue, demonstrating interest and effort in implementing the regulation. It is likely that the legislative process will be accelerated to include both drivers and delivery workers, though excluding them from labour protection.

The Federal Supreme Court has been taking non-binding decisions, the non-existence of an employment relationship between workers and digital platforms in general, overturning decisions of the Labour Court. There is a proposal to decide the issue with general repercussions, that is, which will bind all judges in the country. There is no date for the end of the trial, and a public hearing was held in 2024 that presented several voices showing the need for labour rights for those who work on digital platforms. However, this issue is part of a broader context of anti-worker judicial activism by the Supreme Court, which has been recognising the prevalence of agreements between workers and employers in the form of civil or commercial contracts, even when the characteristics of an employment relationship exist in reality (false self-employment), preventing workers from seeking the reclassification of contracts as employment relationships in the Labour Court, contrary to the guidelines of the International Labour Organisation, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and all other employment legislation around the world.

Thus, there appears to be a movement towards the creation of a subcategory of workers without fundamental labour rights. The core issue is how platforms offer minimum rights for workers and position themselves to circumvent the formal recognition of an employment relationship.



THE FAIRWORK PROJECT


Towards Fair Labour Standards in the Platform Economy

Fairwork evaluates and ranks the working conditions of digital platforms. Our ratings are based on five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure in order to be considered to be offering basic minimum standards of fairness. We evaluate platforms annually against these principles to show not only what the platform economy is today, but also what it can be. The Fairwork ratings provide an independent perspective on labour conditions of platform work for policymakers, platform companies, workers, and consumers. Our goal is to show that better, fairer, jobs are possible in the platform economy. The Fairwork project is coordinated by the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, and the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. Our network of researchers has rated platforms in 41 countries across five continents. In every country, Fairwork collaborates closely with workers, platforms, advocates and policymakers to promote a fairer future of platform work. In Brazil, this research is led by researchers at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul – UFRGS, Federal University of Paraná – UFPR, University of Brasília – UnB, and Federal University of Rio de Janeiro – UFRJ.





FAIRWORK COUNTRIES



AFRICA:

Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda

ASIA:

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

EUROPE:

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Poland, Serbia, Spain, UK

SOUTH AMERICA:

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

NORTH AMERICA:

Mexico, US

THE FAIRWORK FRAMEWORK

Fairwork evaluates the working conditions of digital labour platforms and ranks them on how well they do. To do this, we use five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure to be considered as offering ‘fair work’. The five Fairwork principles were developed through a multi-stakeholder workshop at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and many more workshops in various countries. In the years since then, the principles and their operationalisation have been further fine-tuned. Further details on the thresholds for each principle, and the criteria used to assess the collected evidence to score platforms, can be found in the Appendix.

It is worth noting that the Fairwork principles were updated in 2024 through the collaboration of teams from participating countries. To enhance the analysis of companies in line with the guiding principles, the Fairwork principles were refined to provide greater clarity, while preserving the project’s core principles. The project also had a second round of updates, which took place at a meeting in Asunción, Paraguay, in April 2025. This meeting specifically discussed the Latin American context of platform work, highlighting the need for a methodology that captures local issues, such as technological sovereignty and precariousness, without affecting the general structure of the principles.

STEP 1

Fair Pay

Workers, irrespective of their employment classification, should earn a fair income in their home jurisdiction after taking account of work-related costs. We assess earnings according to the mandated minimum wage in the home jurisdiction, as well as the current living wage.

Fair Conditions

Platforms should have policies in place to protect workers from foundational risks arising from the processes of work and should take proactive measures to protect and promote the health and safety of workers.

Fair Contracts

Terms and conditions should be accessible, readable and comprehensible. The party contracting with the worker must be subject to local law and must be identified in the contract. Regardless of the workers’ employment status, the contract should be free of clauses which unreasonably exclude liability on the part of the service user and/or the platform.



Fair Management

There should be a documented process through which workers can be heard, can appeal decisions affecting them, and be informed of the reasons behind those decisions. There must be a clear channel of communication to workers involving the ability to appeal management decisions or deactivation.

The use of algorithms should be transparent and result in equitable outcomes for workers. There should be an identifiable and documented policy that ensures equity in the way workers are managed on a platform (for example, in the hiring, disciplining, or firing of workers).

Fair Representation

Platforms should provide a documented process through which worker voice can be expressed. Irrespective of their employment classification, workers should have the right to organise in collective bodies, and platforms should be prepared to cooperate and negotiate with them.

STEP 2

Methodology Overview

The Fairwork project uses three approaches to effectively measure fairness of working conditions on digital labour platforms: desk research, approaching platforms for evidence, and worker interviews. Through these three methods, we seek evidence on whether platforms operate in accordance with the five Fairwork Principles.

Desk research

Each annual Fairwork ratings cycle starts with desk research to map the range of platforms to be scored, identify points of contact with management, develop suitable interview guides and survey instruments, and design recruitment strategies to access workers. For each platform, we gather and analyse a wide range of publicly available documents including contracts, terms and conditions, published policies and procedures, as well as digital interfaces.

Desk research also flags any publicly available information that could assist us in scoring different platforms: for instance, the provision of particular services to workers, or the existence of past or ongoing disputes. Once the list of platforms has been finalised, each platform is invited to participate in Fairwork's annual ranking study and provided with information about the process.



Platform evidence

The second method involves approaching platforms for evidence. Platform management is invited to submit evidence and discuss the platform's degree of compliance with each of the Fairwork principles. Evidence may include published policies and/or standard operating procedures, public commitments, and website/app functionality. This evidence provides insights into the operation and business model of the platform, while also opening up a dialogue through which the platform could agree to implement changes based on the principles. In cases where platform managements do not agree to participate in the research, we limit our scoring to evidence obtained through desk research and worker interviews.

Worker interviews

The third method is interviewing platform workers and their representatives directly. These interviews do not aim to be a statistically representative set of experiences. Rather, they are worker case-studies to examine platforms' policies and practices in the field as they pertain to the Fairwork principles. Specifically, they seek to gain insight into how work is carried out, and how work processes are managed and experienced, on platforms. The interviews situate platform work in the careers of workers by understanding their motivation for entry into a platform, how long they envision undertaking work on the current platform before seeking an alternative either on another platform or in a different sector, and how their experience of platform work is shaped by their interaction with fellow workers and the external labour market. These interviews also enable Fairwork researchers to see copies of the contracts issued to workers and to access the app interface, including payout and support screens. This method alerts the team to the presence of issues, but not the frequency or likelihood of their occurrence.

The worker interviews are semi-structured and make use of a series of questions relating to the 10 Fairwork thresholds. In order to qualify for the interviews, workers have to be over the age of 18 and have worked with the platform for at least three months. For this report, the interviews were conducted in Portuguese. In this round, 88 interviews were conducted online in 26 cities and 13 states.


Putting it all together

This threefold approach provides a way to cross-check the claims made by platforms, while also providing the opportunity to collect evidence from multiple sources. Final scores are collectively decided by the Fairwork team based on all three forms of evidence. Points are only awarded if sufficient evidence exists on each threshold.

STEP 3

How we score

Each of the five Fairwork principles is broken down into two points: a first point, and a second point that can only be awarded if the first point has been fulfilled. Every platform receives a score out of 10. Platforms are only given a point when they can satisfactorily demonstrate their implementation of the principles. Failing to achieve a point does not necessarily mean that a platform does not comply with the principle in question. It simply means that we are unable to evidence its compliance. The scoring involves a series of stages. First, the in-country team collates the evidence and assigns preliminary scores. The collated evidence is then sent to external reviewers for independent scoring. These reviewers are both members of the Fairwork teams in other countries, as well as members of the central Fairwork team. Once the external reviewers have assigned their scores, all reviewers meet to discuss the scores and decide the final scoring. Platforms are given the opportunity to submit further evidence to earn points that they were initially not awarded. These scores then form the final annual scoring that is published in the annual country Fairwork report. Before the publication of this report, companies rated were given the opportunity to review and comment on the findings of this report. All responses are included in Appendix II.



FAIRWORK BRAZIL SCORES 2025 BY PRINCIPLE

	1.1	1.2	2.1	2.2	3.1	3.2	4.1	4.2	5.1	5.2	Total
InDrive	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	1
Superprof	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	1
99	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Ame Flash	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
iFood	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Lalamove	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Loggi	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Parafuzo	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Rappi	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Uber	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0

More details on the scores is available at:

www.fair.work/Brazil



EXPLAINING THE SCORES

Fair Pay

In the first threshold, we found enough evidence for Superprof and Indrive to each be awarded a point. It is worth noting that both have the same characteristic of not having a fixed price for services, the prices instead being agreed upon between the workers and customers. The first point requires that platforms guarantee punctual and full payment, and that workers earn at least the local minimum wage or the salary set by a collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, during their active hours, after deducting costs. In the case of Superprof, the interviewees reported achieving satisfactory earnings per hour, despite not being able to work many hours, given the low number of customers on the platform. For Indrive, the interviewees reported higher hourly earnings compared to other platforms. This is because the platform's pay model is different: passengers must offer a fee, and it is up to the driver to accept or decline it. Additionally, the platform's fee is fixed at 10% of the agreed-upon amount in all situations. However, it is necessary to consider that at any moment when the demand for rides decreases, this can lead workers to accepting lower fees.

In relation to the other eight platforms assessed, worker evidence indicated failures in pay systems. In the interviews, we found mentions of delays, amounts withheld or partially transferred. These rates are not always clear to workers, as some reported being surprised by the mechanism. In some cases reported by workers registered on Uber and Loggi, the values changed after the service was performed. Additionally, workers reported that tips were not transferred by iFood and promotions were not paid by AmeFlash. Additionally, workers for 99 reported the risk of not receiving payments, and receiving partial payments when customers pay in cash. In addition, reports of excessive working hours, low hourly pay, and difficulty in covering basic costs were widespread.

One issue that is linked to pay is the multiapping strategy discussed in the Editioal: 62 of the 88 interviewees adopted the strategy of working for more than one platform. This happens especially when the amounts paid for services are considered insufficient, causing them to work for multiple platforms in order to receive slightly better pay and reduce waiting times between requests.

In the second threshold for this principle, workers must earn at least a living wage, or the salary set by collective sectoral agreements (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, during their working hours, after costs. We used the DIEESE indicator of the necessary minimum wage, which, as of June 2025, was calculated at R\$7,416.07. We haven't found evidence to award this second point to any of the ten platforms assessed.



Fair conditions

To achieve the first point, platforms must ensure that they provide adequate equipment and training to protect the health and safety of workers from task-specific hazards. These must be implemented at no additional cost to the worker. The platform should mitigate the risks of lone work by providing adequate support and designing processes with occupational safety and health in mind. In addition, platforms must take significant steps to ensure that workers do not suffer significant costs as a result of work-related accidents, injuries, or illnesses.

To obtain the second point, there must be evidence of significant actions taken by the platform for the social protection of its workers. When workers are unable to work for an extended period due to unforeseen circumstances, their position on the platform should not be negatively impacted. Finally, the platform should implement policies or practices that protect the safety of workers from task-specific risks. In particular, the platform should ensure that remuneration is not structured in such a way to encourage workers to take excessive risks.

We could not find evidence that the ten platforms assessed provide adequate safety equipment at no cost to workers, or that they provide safety training. According to the workers' interviews, iFood only offers discounts on the purchase of equipment or bicycle rental, without direct supply. Some workers consider the lack of safety at work to be a form of violence. An iFood delivery worker commented, "If you don't have the necessary work material, enough so that you don't wear yourself out, you're violating your body."

Uber and 99 have a "panic button" and safety campaigns, but without proven practical effectiveness. Regarding insurance and protection in the event of an accident, although many platforms offer insurance, most of them are limited to the time when the service is being performed. Despite this, there are frequent reports of difficulties in accessing benefits, insufficient coverage, or the need to take disputes to courts. In many cases, the interviewees claim only to get some amount of compensation when they take legal action against the platform. The research identified that scoring systems are common, which penalise delays or cancellations, encouraging the acceleration of work and aggravating the risks for performing the task. In none of the platforms evaluated could we find evidence of any effective social protection programme for sick leave or accidents; on the contrary, there were reports of accounts that were suspended for inactivity, even for medical reasons.



Fair contracts

No platform was able to provide enough evidence to be awarded the first point, which is awarded if the platform ensures that the contracting party with the worker is identified in the contract and is subject to the law of the country in which the worker works. The terms and conditions must be presented in full in clear and understandable language that all workers can understand. Workers must sign a contract and/or give informed consent to the terms and conditions when signing up for the platform. Terms and conditions should be easily accessible to workers on paper or through the app/platform interface at all times. Contracts or terms must not include clauses that reverse the legal structures in force in the respective countries. In addition, platforms must adopt adequate, responsible, and ethical data protection and management measures, established in a documented policy.

No platform could show that they met the threshold for the second point, either. For the second point of this principle, platforms are expected to notify workers of proposed changes in clear and understandable language within a reasonable time before the changes take effect. In this case, the changes should not reverse the existing accrued benefits and reasonable expectations on which workers have referred. The contract/terms and conditions must not include clauses that exclude liability for negligence or unreasonably exempt the platform from liability for working conditions.

The platform must take appropriate measures to ensure that the contract does not include clauses that prevent workers from effectively seeking redress for grievances arising from the employment relationship. In the event that the platform's work is mediated by subcontractors, the platform shall implement a reliable mechanism to monitor and ensure that the subcontractor is complying with the platform's own expected standards in relation to working conditions. Where algorithms are used to determine prices, bonuses, ratings and/or assign jobs, the data collected and the calculations used should be transparent and documented in a form available to workers, in clear and understandable language that all workers can understand.

One case that drew attention in the analysis was that of Superprof, a foreign company based in Paris. The platform in its Terms of Use, does not clearly mention the application of Brazilian legislation, but makes reference to European laws, such as the EU Consumer Code and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). According to most of the workers interviewed, the contract is not accessible. In addition, the terms include questionable clauses, such as the indefinite storage of data, which contravenes the Brazilian General Data Protection Law (LGPD - Law No. 13,709/2018).



Fair management

We could not find evidence that the ten platforms assessed complied with the two thresholds of this principle. The first threshold evaluates the existence of an easily accessible channel for workers to communicate with a human representative of the platform and solve problems effectively, such as meaningfully and effectively appealing low ratings, non-pay, pay issues, deactivations, and other penalties and disciplinary actions. The channel must be documented in the contract, be available on the platform's interface, and platforms must respond to workers within a reasonable timeframe. In the case of deactivations, the appeal process must be available to workers who no longer have access to the platform. Workers should not be harmed for expressing concerns or appealing disciplinary action.

For the second threshold, the research investigated whether the ten platforms have an effective anti-discrimination policy that establishes a clear process for reporting, correcting and penalising discrimination against platform workers on the grounds of race, social origin, caste, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sex, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief, age or any other status. Additionally, the platform should have measures in place to promote diversity, equity, and inclusion on the platform, and it should take practical steps to promote equal opportunities for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, disability and religion or belief.

When people from a disadvantaged group (such as women) are significantly under-represented in a group of workers, the platform should seek to identify and remove barriers to access for people in that group. If algorithms are used to determine access to work or pay, or the type of work and pay scales available to workers who wish to use the platform, they should be transparent and not result in uneven outcomes for workers from historically or currently disadvantaged groups. Finally, the platform should have mechanisms in place to reduce the risk of users discriminating against workers from disadvantaged groups in accessing and performing work.

The worker interviews indicate that platforms such as 99, AmeFlash, iFood, Lalamove and Rappi only offer chats with automated responses, making human contact difficult. Even when there is a human representative, as is the case of Indrive and Loggi, workers reported that responses are slow and not effective.

Workers also reported losing access to support channels when their accounts are blocked, forcing them in many cases to opt for legal actions. This aspect shows the lack of a clear appeal policy to contest punitive actions such as suspensions. In general, we could not find enough evidence of algorithmic transparency, since the definitions of remuneration, distribution of runs/deliveries and scores are not disclosed. There are many workers' reports of unexplained suspensions due to low ratings and to workers raising concerns or claims. Most Rappi workers interviewed reported that workers are often subject to punitive actions, especially after street demonstrations.

Fair representation

No platform was able to provide evidence that would allow them to receive a score for this principle.






To score on this principle, the platform must ensure that there is a documented mechanism for expressing collective worker voice, allowing all workers to participate without risk, regardless of employment status. It must also have a formal, written declaration of willingness to recognise and negotiate with a collective and independent workers' body or trade union, which is clearly communicated to all workers and is available on the platform's interface. Freedom of association should not be inhibited, and workers should not be harmed in any way by communicating their concerns, desires and demands to the platform, or expressing a willingness to form independent collective bodies of representation.

The second point is reached when we find evidence that workers play a significant role in governance, or when a platform publicly and formally recognises an independent collective body of workers, an elected works council or a trade union. This recognition is not exclusive and, where the legal framework allows, the platform should recognise any significant collective body that seeks representation.

The worker interviews indicate that workers face significant obstacles in their collective organisation. For Rappi, there are reports in the interviews of frustrated attempts to formalise unions or other representative associations. The resistance of the companies to collective organisation is also manifested in the legal sphere: Uber, for example, filed a request with the Supreme Court in 2024 to suspend lawsuits that seek to recognise labour ties between drivers and apps³⁹. This indicates that the social dialogue between companies and workers in Brazil is challenging, with union representatives reporting extreme difficulty in establishing any type of negotiation, whether with local or multinational platforms. This combination of factors – from organisational fragility to the intransigent stance of companies – reaffirms an environment hostile to the achievement of basic rights by workers in the platform economy.

PLATFORM IN FOCUS

Rappi

Principle	First Point	Second Point	Total
 Principle 1 Fair Pay	<input type="radio"/> Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs	<input type="radio"/> Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs	<input type="radio"/>
 Principle 2 Fair Conditions	<input type="radio"/> Mitigates task-specific risks	<input type="radio"/> Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net	<input type="radio"/>
 Principle 3 Fair Contracts	<input type="radio"/> Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions	<input type="radio"/> Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed	<input type="radio"/>
 Principle 4 Fair Management	<input type="radio"/> Provides due process for decisions affecting workers	<input type="radio"/> Provides equity in the management process	<input type="radio"/>
 Principle 5 Fair Representation	<input type="radio"/> Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice	<input type="radio"/> Supports democratic governance	<input type="radio"/>





Rappi began operating in Brazil in 2017, quickly establishing itself as a user-friendly platform due to its streamlined registration process. Rappi, in this regard, exemplifies the platformization of work, in which formal contractual binding is replaced by accepting terms under the discourse of apparent autonomy, which can translate into a lack of accountability on the part of the company regarding labour obligations.

Rappi's delivery workers – owners of work tools, such as bicycles, motorcycles, or smartphones – fully bear the operating costs, including vehicle maintenance, fuel, mobile data packages, road fines, and personal safety equipment. With this model, it can be argued that the company transfers all the risks associated with the activity to the worker, even when delivery problems occur. For example, even the costs of not finding the customer or payment refusals fall on the worker.

Generally, according to the interviewed workers, the fees are low. There are situations in which they are forced to take on debts when problems occur with orders, in addition to unjustified account blocks and a lack of transparency. As seen in other platforms, there is also a lack of evidence of social protection and adequate occupational health and safety measures, as well as the absence of recognition of freedom of association.

In interviews, workers frequently complained about low pay per task, delays in payments and deductions due to situations such as incomplete orders or accidents. One of the interviewees stated that to get rid of the deduction, it is necessary to go to a physical office of the company and inform them of the reason that prevented the delivery of the order.

The costs of travelling to the company's physical office are borne by the worker. In addition to deductions and fees, the workers we interviewed reported situations where they face increasing debt with the platform.

These deductions occur in situations such as order cancellations and addresses not found, as reported by one Rappi worker: "I have two undue deductions in my Rappi Delivery account. In one of them, the establishment was closed, and the platform support team said I wouldn't be charged, but I was. The other was from the last delivery I made on the day, when I got home to see my earnings from the delivery, I saw two deductions! When I open a call for support, an automatic message comes that I have no deductions, but it reflects on my earnings. I basically worked the weekend for free, because they charged undue deductions and killed my earnings".

According to the workers we interviewed, although Rappi has fixed payment dates, there are delays and issues with receiving payment, as well as debts incurred due to order cancellations or being unable to locate the customer. The workers also reported being charged fees weekly for the use of the application, which can



constitute a breach of the full payment: "When the customer cancels an order in your hand, this creates a negative balance. [...] You have to take the product to them, otherwise this will be deducted from your account." Another worker commented: "Rappi has a debt business, right? When you have a product that you can't locate the customer, that product generates a debt for you".

There appears to be an asymmetry of power here, with Rappi seeming to hold the unilateral power to block, suspend or reactivate accounts, including withholding amounts and tips. One worker reported, "If you have a high debt, they block you. [...] How are you going to pay the debt if you are blocked?" Many workers reported a lack of awareness that the application automatically activates the ride's self-acceptance function, which allows all available deliveries to be accepted without the option to choose. Only after some time working, did workers say they realised they could disable this function and thus select the better deliveries. However, by disabling self-acceptance, couriers argued they would be penalised regarding their level on the platform, starting to receive fewer orders and, generally, of lower quality. In addition, they feel pressure to accept all rides, as refusing deliveries can result in penalties. One of the interviewees reported: "At Rappi, you schedule [times for order collection] with self-acceptance. Everything you touch is already accepted automatically. When you remove it, you start getting worse rides."

According to workers, the lack of data protection can foster harassment and vulnerability. One worker reported a problem in this sense: "I finished the race, handed it to a man at the hotel. When I got home, a message was sent on my cell phone... he said: 'You made a delivery here for me. You don't want to come here, do you? I'll send an Uber to pick you up.' [...] Then he said: 'I got [your number] through the platform.'"

In another case, she was harassed by a restaurant employee: "He kept asking if I was single... then he sent a [intimate] photo [...] I think the restaurant has access to the delivery man's phone." Such episodes reveal the specific vulnerability of women and the lack of effective measures by the company to protect its workers from harassment and violence.

Delivery workers have been shown to bear all the costs of safety equipment and work. Official backpack is recommended, not mandatory. There is no evidence of any policy or measure to reduce the risks of lone working. The medical plan with co-participation appears to be only available for the "I am Rappi" (Sou Rappi, in Portuguese) member category. There is no evidence of effective social protection. According to the interviewees, in the case of inactivity due to a work accident, the delivery person loses benefits, receives fewer orders, or can be dismissed. Accident insurance, valid only "en route", was perceived by a number of the workers we interviewed as being overly bureaucratic, so that many could not access it, even despite serious injuries.

There is a lack of evidence of safety policies. Deadlines were perceived by workers to be strict, with constant charges for fast deliveries. According to workers, failure to meet the delivery time, which workers reported as often being hard to meet, results in a penalty. "The charge is out of the ordinary. [...] The delivery time is absurd. [...]"



You are penalised if you don't keep the time." The contractual terms set by Rappi are overly long, difficult to understand, and include clauses that exclude the company from liability. Contractual changes are notified in advance, but delivery workers report that these changes are unilateral and harmful. The evidence from our desk research indicates that the company suggests to delivery workers that they look for a "hub" to solve issues. However, most of the interviewees agree on the difficulties in solving disputes and seeking remedy in cases of deactivation, for example. Several workers reported that communication is mostly done by chatbots and human representatives appear to be rare: "The bot tires you so you stop talking", said one worker. "Rappi's support is terrible", said another. According to the workers' accounts, considering the response time and bureaucracy, it is hard to solve disputes and problems.

Another complaint from workers concerns situations of discrimination on the platform. Rappi has a clause against discriminatory practices and a "panic button" for cases of racism or threats by customers. However, the workers we interviewed questioned their effectiveness. Lastly, problems related to governance and freedom of association were also highlighted by the workers we interviewed. The existence of democratic governance practices could not be evidenced, nor recognition of freedom of association. On the contrary, persecutions and deactivations were reported against delivery workers who participated in demonstrations or criticised the platform. One worker we interviewed attended a protest and heard reports of workers being punished: "Here in João Pessoa, there was a demonstration against Logistics Operators (outsourced companies). There were four days of demonstration. Some individuals had their accounts banned. And getting to the point of being banned is that your national identification number will never enter that platform again. And there was no way to dispute it."

There is no evidence of workers' participation in the governance of the platform, nor is there any recorded and documented evidence that a collective worker organisation can be recognised by the company. There are even reports that point to the existence of frustrated attempts to form unions or collective organisations.



WORKERS' STORIES⁴⁰

Fátima*, Parafuzo

Fátima is 39 year old mother who works for Parafuzo. She was born and lives in ABC Paulista⁴¹, in the State of São Paulo. She graduated as a nursing technician and worked for years as a caregiver, doing home care. She has been working on digital cleaning platforms for the past four years. She tried to work with other platforms, but did not adapt.

Today, she does three to four cleanings a week, managing to earn around 180 US dollars gross per month. The platform divides the cleanings into four, five, six, and seven hour slots and informs the workers about the type of work that will be carried out in the house. The worker explains: "if the client ordered the windows, refrigerator, closet inside, if it's a heavy cleaning that you have to drag everything, or if it's a residential cleaning that is a lighter thing, it's all very well explained within the platform". Fátima prefers to do the seven-hour service, depending on the amount and expenses she will have with transport. On average, spends four hours a day on public transport commuting between work and home.

The workers do not establish the prices for the cleaning. They don't even know how much the customer pays the platform, except when payment is made in cash. Transportation and food are paid out of their pockets, as are cleaning supplies. "I get very upset when I get to the customer, he gives me just a detergent to clean his house. So, I always carry cleaning products, multi-purpose cleaners, and some clean clothes, but then the choice is mine. But it ends up being costly."

The company offers free insurance to workers in case of accidents. Fátima's main fears at work are falling in the bathroom, catching an infection, falling down the stairs, getting injured while cleaning apartment windows and, especially, harassment and violence from customers. Like other workers, she reported that in the case of harassment or violence from customers, Parafuzo has a direct channel to help the cleaners. However, despite preventing the customer from being able to hire the person again, they are not blocked on the platform, and can still hire the services of others.

The platform's main form of communication with workers is through live streams on the internet. They serve, for example, to explain changes in the rules of the contract or to disseminate security and anti-discrimination policies. However, in live streams, it is not recommended to criticise or complain about the company, as Fátima reported: "when someone complains about something, [they are] automatically muted there. The comment is deleted." The live streams also serve as a space of control over workers and repression of those who decide to contest the company. Fátima reported that she and other colleagues had a Facebook group in which they shared criticism of the company and reports of their day-to-day work. She said she was surprised when, in one of the company's live streams, comments that were posted in this closed Facebook group were displayed by platform representatives, who "took the comments of several girls and passed them on live, saying that it was fake news, that it was a lie".



Observing this company's behaviour, Fátima and her colleagues decided to create a group on WhatsApp, in order to have a safe place to share information with each other. However, soon after, they were surprised when one of the group participants who had made a critical comment about the company was blocked. Finally, they decided to delete the group, and since then, she has been in contact with only two colleagues. Because of this performance of the platform, the biggest challenge of the fieldwork was to find Parafuzo workers who were willing to grant an interview, since they fear retaliation by the company, such as blocking and banning accounts.

Fernanda*, Lalamove

Fernanda, a 53-year-old woman, has started but not completed a higher education course in pedagogy. She was born, lives and works in São Paulo. She has run a restaurant with her husband for 16 years. Her first experience with digital work platforms was at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, in 2020, with companies such as Lalamove, 99, Uber, and iFood. At the time, she thought it was not worth the effort due to the high costs, especially fuel. But she re-registered in 2024 when the family restaurant's income dropped and, since then, she has dedicated around 8 to 10 hours a day, every day of the week, to delivering goods using the family car.

On a daily basis, Fernanda and her husband analyse demand on the app. The payment for each ride is calculated by mileage, but Fernanda thinks that the company should take into account the dimensions and weights of the loads, and should have a better policy to minimise risks and prevent dangerous situations. She says that if the value of deliveries per kilometre that day is not worth it, she does not work on the app, moving to 99 instead. She is not aware that the platform provides safety equipment and training. Everything Fernanda learned about the work was from colleagues through WhatsApp or Facebook groups.

One of the major problems reported by Fernanda and other interviewees who work for Lalamove is the risks of robberies, violence and scams. Fernanda says that it has been a recurrent issue to receive a demand through the app, go to the location, and then find out that it was a scam. The scam works by the scammer pretending to be buying something on e-commerce platforms such as Facebook, OLX and Mercado Libre, and requesting Lalamove's service. The driver then collects the order without the seller receiving payment from the scammer. However, this puts the driver at risk. When the seller refuses to hand the product to the delivery worker due to lack of payment by the client, workers do not receive payment for the collection service. She says that drivers have already recognized that more expensive items, such as bicycles and televisions, are the most commonly chosen by scammers.


Fernanda claims that she once went to the house of an OLX salesman to collect a television at the request of a scammer who requested her service at Lalamove. The seller, however, did not release the television. When she started to question this with the contractor of her service, he blocked her. She then realised that it was a scam attempt. Fernanda fears for her personal safety and her assets in these situations: "they have my license plate, they have access to a tracking system, they can get to me, these scammers, right?"



She also comments on a recent update to the platform that allows customers to call the delivery person through WhatsApp, which she considers a lack of security and a lack of protection of their personal data by the company: "It has happened that a scammer has called us on WhatsApp, you know? And I found that a lack of... Of privacy, right? In the same way that we don't have the customer's contact, they couldn't have ours either, right?". To avoid such situations, she asks questions to both those who requested her service and to the person at the location where she will pick up the goods. The goal is to try to probe both to verify that there is no scam attempt.

She explains that the platform does not provide any assistance or coverage in these cases. She states that the disciplinary system falls on drivers, including blocking or banning by the platform. For example, when the worker cancels an order that he considers a scam or suspicious, they are penalised in their score in the application, which serves as a criterion for the distribution of delivery demands. When the scam happens and they report it, the platform blocks the possibility of the customer placing new orders with the driver, but does not block the customer from the platform. In addition, the burden falls on the workers to produce evidence for their defence. They need to make videos and take photos or screenshots of the situation to prove they were not responsible for the problem, but were instead victims of scammers. In some cases, they have to return to a risky place to be able to prove their defence.

Additionally, they are highly vulnerable to the transportation of illicit goods. "Before we move, every driver asks what he is going to carry, what he is going to transport, to know the measurements, and if the package is going to get into the car. But in the case of an illicit product, they won't say if it's really or not, if it's a drug, something like that, there's no way for us to know." Fernanda knows several colleagues who have had problems with illicit cargo. One of them was stopped at a checkpoint, and the police seized the car. In these cases, the platform is not held responsible, and it doesn't help the worker: "I've seen reports in the group of the driver having to pay for everything, with the lawyer's expense, the stay in the yard there that seizes the car, right? Everyone was astonished by the driver reporting this. She said, 'I was caught and I had to pay'. It [the platform] is not responsible for anything, nothing. I had to pay for the lawyer and the stay of my car in the police yard."



Bruno*, iFood

Bruno, 39 years old, a subcontracted bicycle delivery man for iFood in Rio de Janeiro, has been working for the platform for 5 years. His working hours are around 70 to 80 hours per week and he receives net US\$ 180. His work costs are the rental of the electric bicycle, R\$ 90.00 per week, and food supplement, R\$ 200.00 per month. The use of the food supplement was a medical recommendation, due to the physical exhaustion imposed by the pace of work. As the activity is very intense, it is necessary to replace proteins and vitamins. Weekly, Bruno needs to travel 13 km to leave his bike to charge and return home with another charged bike to work the next day.

Bruno says he is lucky not to have suffered any work accident yet, but he knows stories of other delivery workers who suffered serious accidents and received derisory amounts from the insurance contracted by iFood: “If a guy broke his leg, was out for a year, he receives US\$ 360 (...) This calculation (of insurance) is never enough, never,” he says. He reports that working conditions have worsened since he started his work on the platform. Today he needs to work more hours and his remuneration is lower.

Bruno says one of the biggest problems with the company is that the treatment of the customer is different from that given to the worker: “If the customer complains, on the spot, you are penalized. Next week, your score will go down.” This makes workers resort to the help of colleagues and other subterfuges, as exemplified by Bruno: “so much so that there has been a case of my tire getting flat and I call one of my friends to do the race for me. So as not to have this penalty”.

Performance metrics are elevated and managed using Artificial Intelligence. The worker’s score depends on the number of deliveries, the number of refusals, and the evaluation of stores and customers. The platform states that the rate of compliance with these metrics is 98 to 99%, and that any errors are paid for by the workers themselves. Issues related to order delivery are classified as “events.” The worker is entitled to have only one of these “events” paid for by the platform. Bruno explained that his bicycle tire was punctured three times in the same week, which prevented him from delivering the orders. In this case, the platform paid only one of the times, and the others counted negatively in his score. He explains that if “the tire has a puncture, you have to send a photo. You send a photo and your score still goes down. They say that the photo was not valid, the customer evaluated you badly for some reason, and your score goes down. The store rated you badly, your score goes down”.

Complaining and seeking support from the company appears to be a practically impossible task: “You file an appeal, but the platform does not respond to you. Who answers you is a robot. And sometimes it takes a long time to respond.” Therefore, the resource most used by him is an external website used by consumers to make complaints about poor service provision by companies. Bruno is part of an association representing other workers in his state. He reports that iFood even receives the associations and holds meetings, however, the meetings do not result in improvements for the category, and often the associations give up participating in these activities, which are seen as a waste of time.

*All worker names have been changed to ensure the confidentiality of the participants.

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THEME IN FOCUS

Digital neo-colonizers: platforms pay little and still profit from loans to workers

The deepening of the neoliberal economic model in the twenty-first century has reconfigured relations of dependence and updated colonial formats, which now appear under new guises. In search of new forms of exploitation, money-capital reterritorializes capitalist, economic, and political structures in the contemporary world⁴². Financial logic is at the heart of platform work, initially materialised by its strong presence in the financial market, through listings on stock exchanges, speculation, and ties to transnational capital⁴³. Another point is that the transfer of production chains to the peripheral countries of the Global South in order to intensify the exploitation of labour, is now enormously facilitated through digital platforms⁴⁴. With the ability to transcend geographical barriers, the use of technology has enabled these corporations to operate as digital neo-colonisers, extracting enormous amounts of surplus labour from these countries⁴⁵.

This dynamic reproduces the historical logic of colonialism, now mediated by technology, according to which peripheral countries and individuals become dependent on algorithmic and financial systems that perpetuate power asymmetries⁴⁶. In this productive organization, platforms impose a form of servitude through the removal of responsibility for risks, control of data and access through algorithms, and strenuous working hours⁴⁷. The low remuneration and the high cost of maintenance of the means of work facilitate the predatory action of rentism on workers. With this, they end up resorting to credits (often provided by the digital platforms themselves) or submitting to financialization mechanisms of these companies. In other words, working on the platform can not only not generate profit for the worker, but also leaves them in debt. If the maintenance of the vehicle, fines or other expenses exceed the earnings, it becomes negative, with the worker left needing to take on loans.

So, although financialization strategies take on many layers, in the platforms we evaluated for this report it has been possible to observe the performance of companies as financial institutions that make up the basis of their profits, including offering loans to workers. The workers we interviewed for this study identified worrying practices related to digital platforms. On the one hand, companies exempt themselves from any obligations, hold workers responsible for any and all misfortunes related to the activity, and impose low pay on them, even for long working hours. On the other hand, they have created their own financial agencies, which guarantee pre-approved loans to workers.

The indebtedness of workers, resulting from labour costs, acquired as a result of the work health problems and low pay, is growing. According to research conducted in Brazil, about 92% of drivers on digital platforms are in debt⁴⁸. The workers we interviewed spoke of the recurring costs of car maintenance, for example. An Uber driver told us: “When I pay for this mechanical part, even if I pay in three installments, it is already out of my salary.” Another context concerns the lack of protection of workers in case they are affected by accidents or poor health acquired due to overwork, which ends up leading them to the accumulation of debts for not being able to work: “We are spending a lot of time stopped with thrombosis problems, vision problems, mental problems, so today most workers are in debt” (Uber worker). Still, there is the issue of platforms offering very low recompense for the work done. In this sense, workers told us things like: “I can survive. I can have lunch, I can have dinner and pay for some other lower expenses. But for the most important bills, I need to cover the costs myself: council tax, electricity, and a lot of other things” (Uber worker).

Finally, there are also debts generated by the digital platforms themselves, in the form of debts incurred following cancellation of orders and accidents suffered during collections, or debt incurred when platforms charge a weekly fee for using the application. These cases are usually more common in the case of subcontracting, when the worker is subordinated to an outsourced company that provides services to the platform. In the midst of this context of scarcity, workers often find themselves in a very vulnerable situation, with platforms presenting themselves as a means to solving their financial problems.

Platform companies profit even more from the interest on financing. In the words of one Uber driver we spoke to: “They sent a loan on my app, US\$273, if I’m not mistaken. Oh, you have a pre-approved. Then, in desperation, you have to pay for your medicines, end up accepting. Then I quickly filled in the data. At the same time, the money was sent to my account.” The workers also reference the sale of insurance and car rental. The platform partners with insurance and rental companies, and the purchase of a service results in an automatic deduction from the worker’s app balance. Following this dynamic, the same Uber worker explains: “without having worked anything, I already came in on Monday to work in debt”.

Uber, specifically, has its own bank, Banco Didio. Workers who join the service get a credit card associated with the account. iFood has its own bank, iFood Pago, which has exceeded 1.2 billion reais in revenue (approximately USD 250 million). The plan is for the financial arm to produce 50% of the company’s revenue in five years⁴⁹. In the case of Indrive, there are also reports of loans to drivers. One of them explains: “they put in a driver’s loan, and they put it like this, ‘active drivers can get a loan fast and hassle-free, apply now’. But then you have to have a certain number of rides a day, to be able to ensure that you can get the loan linked to some of their financial institutions.” (Indrive Worker). There’s a lot of hype around selling loans to workers. Besides earning interest, the platform increases the likelihood that a worker will remain with the company while they’re still paying off their debt.

Such a context indicates that the supposed autonomy in platform work is fallacious, since the transfer of the risks of the enterprise to the worker induces them to a position of servitude. In this way, the “choice” for the loan is dictated by a scenario of indebtedness and the absence of alternatives. The narratives presented here reveal the subtleties of a profound restructuring of the world of work, driven by technology. Platformisation brings with it the intensification of exploitation, imposing a relationship of dependence of the worker on the company.

In light of this, it is imperative that the debate focuses on guaranteeing rights and fair conditions to workers whose work is managed and controlled by digital technologies. According to the project’s interviews with unionized workers, access to negotiation is quite restricted, not only with foreign platforms, but also with local ones. To this end, countries in the Global South need to intensify South–South cooperation to inhibit predatory behavior and hold corporations accountable for their deleterious effects on those who live from work.



LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Pathways of Change

Fairwork’s theory of change relies on a humanist belief in the power of empathy and knowledge. If they have the economic means to choose, many consumers will be discerning about the platform services they use. Our yearly ratings give consumers the ability to choose the highest scoring platform operating in a sector, thus contributing to pressure on platforms to improve their working conditions and their scores. In this way, we leverage consumer solidarity with workers’ allies in the fight for fairer working conditions. Beyond individual consumer choices, our scores can help inform the procurement, investment and partnership policies of large organisations. They can serve as a reference for institutions and companies who want to ensure they are supporting fair labour practices. In this regard, we see four pathways to change (Figure 2).





Figure 2. Fairworks’s Pathways to Change

Our fieldwork data, combined with feedback from workshops and consultations involving workers, informs how we systematically evolve the Fairwork principles to remain in line with their needs. There is nothing inevitable about poor working conditions in the platform economy. Despite their claims to the contrary, platforms have substantial control over the nature of the jobs that they mediate. Workers who find their jobs through platforms are ultimately workers, and there is no basis for denying them the key rights and protections that their counterparts in the formal sector have long enjoyed. Our scores show that the platform economy, as we know it today, already takes many forms, with some platforms displaying greater concern for workers' needs than others. This means that we do not accept low pay, poor conditions, inequity, and a lack of agency and voice as the norm. We hope that our work – by highlighting the contours of today's platform economy – paints a picture of what it could become.

Figure 3: Fairwork Principles: Continuous Worker-guided Evolution



The Fairwork Brazil team has been working on different fronts to build a fairer platform economy. Ricardo Festi participated in the Public Hearing at the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil on the link between drivers and digital platforms, in December 2024, and in the Public Hearing at the Federal Chamber of Deputies concerning the consequences of working on food delivery platforms, in May 2025.

There was representation of the project at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Subcommittee on the Individual Passenger Transport Service by Motorcycle, held in August 2025 at the São Paulo City Council. On the occasion, perspectives on the labour and social impacts of passenger transport services by motorcycle mediated by platforms were presented.

Members of the team maintained constant dialogue with platform workers' associations and unions during and after the Tripartite Group created by the federal government in 2023 to discuss regulation for the sector. Fairwork partnered with the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) to prepare a pamphlet with information on workers' rights in platform companies to be distributed to unions and workers.

The team also helped in the articulation and construction of a public hearing in the Federal Chamber of Deputies, held in June 2025, to debate the safety and health of digital platform workers. These members have collaborated in the preparation of a bill on the subject, in dialogue with a network of researchers from all over Brazil.

In addition, there is the production of a video widely disseminated on social networks, addressing the demands and rights demanded by workers during the 2025 strikes. Other research was also carried out in networks, both in Brazil and in other Latin American countries, with the aim of fostering the debate on platform work, exposing the conditions of informality and absence of rights and, thus, generating knowledge that contributes to the elaboration of public policies aimed at improving working and living conditions

Throughout this new Fairwork Brazil scoring cycle, the team also contacted all the platforms evaluated, explaining the research and encouraging companies to not only provide information, but also to adopt measures in line with Fairwork principles.

The Fairwork Pledge

As part of this process of change, we have introduced the Fairwork pledge. This pledge leverages the power of organisations' procurement, investment, and partnership policies to support fairer platform work. Organisations like universities, schools, businesses, and charities who make use of platform labour can make a difference by supporting the best labour practices, guided by our five principles of fair work. Organisations who sign the pledge get to display our badge on company organisational materials.

The pledge constitutes two levels. The first is as an official Fairwork Supporter, which entails publicly demonstrating support for fairer platform work, and making resources available to staff and members to help them in deciding which platforms to engage with. We are proud to announce that we have six official Fairwork Supporters in Germany: the Digital Transformation Centers, the Berliner Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales, the ISF Munich, the IfS Frankfurt, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung's Competence Centre Future of Work, and Algorithmwatch. A second level of the pledge entails organisations committing to concrete and meaningful changes in their own practices as official Fairwork Partners, for example by committing to using better-rated platforms where there is a choice. The Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), the GIZ, the Deutscher Verband der freien Übersetzer und Dolmetscher e. V. (DVÜD), the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG), and McDonald's Germany have become official Fairwork Partners in Germany

MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE PLEDGE, AND HOW TO SIGN UP, IS AVAILABLE AT [FAIR.WORK/PLEDGE](https://www.fairwork.org/en/fairwork-pledge)



APPENDIX I

Fairwork Scoring System

Which companies are covered by the Fairwork principles?

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines a “digital labour platform” as an enterprise that mediates and facilitates “labour exchange between different users, such as businesses, workers and consumers”⁵⁰. That includes digital labour “marketplaces” where “businesses set up the tasks and requirements and the platforms match these to a global pool of workers who can complete the tasks within the specified time”⁵¹. Marketplaces that do not facilitate labour exchanges - for example, Airbnb (which matches owners of accommodation with those seeking to rent short term accommodation) and eBay (which matches buyers and sellers of goods) are obviously excluded from the definition. The ILO’s definition of “digital labour platform” is widely accepted and includes many different business models⁵². Fairwork’s research covers digital labour platforms that fall within this definition that aim to connect individual service providers with consumers of the service through the platform interface. Fairwork’s research does not cover platforms that mediate offers of employment between individuals and employers (whether on a long-term or on a temporary basis).

Fairwork distinguishes between two types of these platforms. The first, is ‘geographically tethered’ platforms where the work is required to be done in a particular location such as delivering food from a restaurant to an apartment, driving a person from one part of town to another or cleaning. These are often referred to as ‘gig work platforms’. The second is ‘cloudwork’ platforms where the work can, in theory, be performed from any location via the internet.

The thresholds for meeting each principle are different for location-based and cloudwork platforms because location-based work platforms can be benchmarked against local market factors, risks/harms, and regulations that apply in that country, whereas cloudwork platforms cannot because (by their nature) the work can be performed from anywhere and so different market factors, risks/harms, and regulations apply depending on where the work is performed.

The platforms covered by Fairwork’s research have different business, revenue and governance models including employment-based, subcontractor, commission-based, franchise, piece-rate, shift-based, subscription models. Some of those models involve the platforms making direct payments to workers (including through sub-contractors).

How does the scoring system work?

The five Principles of Fairwork were developed through an extensive literature review of published research on job quality, stakeholder meetings at UNCTAD and the ILO in Geneva (involving platform operators, policymakers, trade unions, and academics), and in-country meetings with local stakeholders. Each Fairwork Principle is divided into two points. Accordingly, for each Principle, the scoring system allows the first to be awarded corresponding to the first threshold, and an additional second point to be awarded corresponding to the second threshold. The second point under each Principle can only be awarded if the first point for that Principle has been awarded. The thresholds specify the evidence required for a platform to receive a given point. Where no verifiable evidence is available that meets a given threshold, the platform is not awarded that point. A platform can therefore receive a maximum Fairwork score of 10 points. Fairwork scores are updated on a yearly basis; the scores presented in this report were derived from data pertaining to the eight months between September 2024 and April 2025 and are valid until April 2026.

Principle	First Point	Second Point	Total
Principle 1 Fair Pay	Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs	Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs	2
Principle 2 Fair Conditions	Mitigates task-specific risks	Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net	2
Principle 3 Fair Contracts	Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions	Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed	2
Principle 4 Fair Management	Provides due process for decisions affecting workers	Provides equity in the management process	2
Principle 5 Fair Representation	Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice	Supports democratic governance	2

Maximum possible Fairwork Score:



Principle 1:

Fair Pay

1.1 – Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs (one point) Platform workers often have substantial work-related costs to cover, such as transport between jobs, supplies, or fuel, insurance, and maintenance on a vehicle⁵³. Workers’ costs sometimes mean their take-home earnings may fall below the local minimum wage⁵⁴. Workers also absorb the costs of extra time commitment, when they spend time waiting or travelling between jobs, or other unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as mandatory training, which are also considered active hours⁵⁵. To achieve this point platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local minimum wage. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure both of the following: • Payment must be on time and in-full. • Workers earn at least the local minimum wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs⁵⁶.

1.2 – Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs (one additional point) In some places, the minimum wage is not enough to allow workers to afford a basic but decent standard of living. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local living wage. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure the following: • Workers earn at least a local living wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs^{57 58}.

Principle 2:

Fair Conditions

2.1 – Mitigates task-specific risks (one point) Platform workers may encounter a number of risks in the course of their work, including accidents and injuries, harmful materials, and crime and violence. To achieve this point, platforms must show that they are aware of these risks and take basic steps to mitigate them. The platform must satisfy the following: • Adequate equipment and training are provided to protect workers’ health and safety from task-specific risks⁵⁹. These should be implemented at no additional cost to the worker. • The platform mitigates the risks of lone working by providing adequate support and designing processes with occupational safety and health in mind. • Platforms take meaningful steps to ensure that workers do not suffer significant costs as a result of accident, injury or disease resulting from work.

2.2 – Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net (one additional point) Platform workers are vulnerable to the possibility of abruptly losing their income as the result of unexpected or external circumstances, such as, for example, sickness, or parenthood. Most countries provide a social safety net to ensure workers don’t experience sudden poverty due to circumstances outside their control⁶⁰. However, platform workers usually don’t qualify for protections such as sick pay, because of their independent contractor status. In recognition of the fact that most workers are dependent on income they earn from platform work, platforms should ensure that



workers are compensated for loss of income due to inability to work. In addition, platforms must minimise the risk of sickness and injury even when all the basic steps have been taken. The platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • The platform takes meaningful steps towards the social protection of its workers. • Where workers are unable to work for an extended period due to unexpected circumstances, their standing on the platform is not negatively impacted. • The platform implements policies or practices that protect workers' safety from task-specific risks. In particular, the platform should ensure that pay is not structured in a way that incentivizes workers to take excessive levels of risk.

Principle 3:

Fair Contracts

3.1 – Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions (one point) The terms and conditions governing platform work are not always clear and accessible to workers⁶¹. To achieve this point, the platform must demonstrate that workers are able to understand, agree to, and access the conditions of their work at all times and that they have legal recourse if the other party breaches those conditions. The platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • The party contracting with the worker must be identified in the contract, and subject to the law of the country/ state/region in which the worker works. • The contract/terms & conditions are presented in full in clear and comprehensible language that all workers could be expected to understand. • Workers have to sign a contract and/or give informed consent to terms of conditions upon signing up for the platform. • The contracts/terms and conditions are easily accessible to workers in paper form, or via the app/ platform interface at all times. • Contracts/terms & conditions do not include clauses that revert prevailing legal frameworks in the respective countries. • Platforms take adequate, responsible and ethical data protection and management measures, laid out in a documented policy⁶².

3.2 – Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed (one additional point) In some cases, especially under 'independent contractor' classifications, workers carry a disproportionate amount of risk for engaging in a contract with the service user. They may be liable for any damage arising in the course of their work, and they may be prevented by unfair clauses from seeking legal redress for grievances. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate that risks and liability of engaging in the work is shared between parties. Regardless of how the contractual status of the worker is classified, the platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • Every worker is notified of proposed changes in clear and understandable language within a reasonable timeframe before changes come into effect; and the changes should not reverse existing accrued benefits and reasonable expectations on which workers have relied. • The contract/terms and conditions neither include clauses which exclude liability for negligence nor unreasonably exempt the platform from liability for working conditions. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure that the contract does not include clauses which prevent workers from effectively seeking redress for grievances which arise from the working relationship. • In case platform labour is mediated by subcontractors: The platform implements a reliable mechanism to monitor and ensure that the subcontractor is living up to the standards expected



from the platform itself regarding working conditions. • In cases where algorithms are used to determine pricing, bonuses, ratings and/or allocate jobs, the data collected, and calculations used must be transparent and documented in a form available to workers in clear and comprehensible language that all workers could be expected to understand.

Principle 4:

Fair Management

4.1 – Provides due process for decisions affecting workers (one point) Platform workers can experience arbitrary deactivation; being barred from accessing the platform without explanation and potentially losing their income. Workers may be subject to other penalties or disciplinary decisions without the ability to contact the service user or the platform to challenge or appeal them if they believe they are unfair. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate an avenue for workers to meaningfully appeal disciplinary actions. The platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • There is an easily accessible channel for workers to communicate with a human representative of the platform and to effectively solve problems. This channel is documented in the contract and available on the platform interface. Platforms should respond to workers within a reasonable timeframe. • There is a process for workers to meaningfully and effectively appeal low ratings, non-payment, payment issues, deactivations, and other penalties and disciplinary actions. This process is documented in a contract and available on the platform interface⁶³. • In the case of deactivations, the appeals process must be available to workers who no longer have access to the platform. • Workers are not disadvantaged for voicing concerns or appealing disciplinary actions.

4.2 – Provides equity in the management process (one additional point) The majority of platforms do not actively discriminate against particular groups of workers. However, they may inadvertently exacerbate already existing inequalities in their design and management. For example, there is a lot of gender segregation between different types of platform work. To achieve this point, platforms must show not only that they have policies against discrimination, but also that they seek to remove barriers for disadvantaged groups and promote inclusion. Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following: • The platform has an effective anti-discrimination policy laying out a clear process for reporting, correcting and penalising discrimination of workers on the platform on grounds such as race, social origin, caste, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sex, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief, age or any other status⁶⁴. • The platform has measures in place to promote diversity, equality and inclusion on the platform. It takes practical measures to promote equality of opportunity for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, disability, and religion or belief. • Where persons from a disadvantaged group (such as women) are significantly under-represented among a pool of workers, it seeks to identify and remove barriers to access by persons from that group. • If algorithms are used to determine access to work or remuneration or the type of work and pay scales available to workers seeking to use the platform, these are transparent and do not result in inequitable outcomes for workers from



historically or currently disadvantaged groups. • It has mechanisms to reduce the risk of users discriminating against workers from disadvantaged groups in accessing and carrying out work.

Principle 5:

Fair Representation

5.1 – Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice (one point) Freedom of association is a fundamental right for all workers, and enshrined in the constitution of the International Labour Organisation, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right for workers to organise, collectively express their wishes – and importantly – be listened to, is an important prerequisite for fair working conditions. However, rates of organisation amongst platform workers remain low. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that the conditions are in place to encourage the expression of collective worker voice. Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following: • There is a documented mechanism⁶⁵ for the expression of collective worker voice that allows ALL workers, regardless of employment status, to participate without risks. • There is a formal, written statement of willingness to recognise, and bargain with, a collective, independent body of workers or trade union, that is clearly communicated to all workers, and available on the platform interface⁶⁶. • Freedom of association is not inhibited, and workers are not disadvantaged in any way for communicating their concerns, wishes and demands to the platform, or expressing willingness to form independent collective bodies of representation^{67 68}.

5.2 – Supports democratic governance (one additional point) While rates of organisation remain low, platform workers' associations are emerging in many sectors and countries. We are also seeing a growing number of cooperative worker-owned platforms. To realise fair representation, workers must have a say in the conditions of their work. This could be through a democratically governed cooperative model, a formally recognised union, or the ability to undertake collective bargaining with the platform. The platform must satisfy at least ONE of the following: • Workers play a meaningful role in governing it. • In a written document available at all times on the platform interface, the platform publicly and formally recognises an independent collective body of workers, an elected works council, or trade union. This recognition is not exclusive and, when the legal framework allows, the platform should recognise any significant collective body seeking representation⁶⁹.



APPENDIX II

Platforms' comments

Prior to publication, all companies rated were given an opportunity to review the score and provide a comment. Below are all of the responses we received from the companies.

Parafuzo:

“Parafuzo is a domestic services marketplace active since 2014, with about 2 million services already intermediated in more than 200 municipalities. The platform connects tens of thousands of self-employed professionals and customers in the hiring of cleaning, ironing clothes and furniture assembly, offering quality working conditions, recognized by continuous positive evaluations and by an NPS (Net Promoter Score) of 95 out of 100 among professionals, a satisfaction and loyalty index that can be considered remarkably high. We regret that the Fairwork methodology, by disregarding local realities and evidence presented, has not recognized the advantages of Parafuzo in relation to the traditional market, marked by informality and low remuneration. On the platform, all professionals receive more than R\$ 15 net per hour and 97.5% receive more than R\$ 18 net per hour, after discounting costs, with total flexibility and autonomy. In commercial journeys, monthly earnings exceed R\$ 3,300, and may exceed R\$ 6,000. We operate with fair and transparent terms of use, in line with legislation and user protection. The services do not involve relevant risks and all professionals have free personal accident insurance, transparent communication, safe protocols and dedicated service channels, reaffirming our commitment to adequate conditions, autonomy and positive social impact.”

Fairwork Brazil's response:

We thank Parafuzo for their constant dialogue with the project. We received and analyzed the evidence submitted by the company, which is just one of multiple data collection sources used in the research. In this case, the platform must meet all the standards of the items and principles so that it can score.

Uber:

“Uber did not participate in this year's study, as well as in previous editions, because it understands that the guiding principle of the research is based on premises derived from traditional employment models, without considering the need to reconcile flexibility and autonomy – central aspects and widely valued by drivers and delivery workers, as pointed out by several independent surveys. From the beginning, we have signaled relevant limitations that, in our view, compromise the usefulness of the study to guide real improvements for workers. However, such considerations were never incorporated or even given an opening for constructive



dialogue. In addition to methodological flaws – such as the use of samples without statistical representativeness – the 2023 report presented unfounded assertions, such as the extrapolation of specific cases to all platforms, the incorrect generalization that the sector is resistant to regulation by the federal government, or even the criticism of serious research supported by the sector, replaced by reports based on fragile sources. Uber has presented a clear global proposal in defense of a regulation that expands benefits and protections to self-employed workers and we have adopted this same stance in Brazil. Our active participation in the Tripartite Working Group convened by the federal government and the concrete contribution to the construction of PLP 12/2024 are evidence of this commitment. By insisting on a line disconnected from the practical challenges of protections and preferences of workers, without recognizing advances or debating viable solutions, the report misses the opportunity to contribute effectively to the formulation of balanced and sustainable public policies.”

Fairwork Brazil’s response:

We regret Uber’s choice not to participate in the project. When we have the opportunity to dialogue with companies, we explain our research methodology. It is a consensus in academia that qualitative methods do not seek to produce generalizations. On the other hand, they are evidence described in depth, which are very valid for the knowledge of social phenomena and, therefore, distinct (and complementary) to quantitative data. In addition, we do not understand that the company’s stance in defense of the “false self-employed” is an advance in relation to the principles of decent work, the foundation on which Fairwork is based.

99:

“99 refutes the results of the interviews because the methodology used by Fairwork was not followed: the company was not contacted to participate in the stage of interviews with managers foreseen in the evaluation process. According to Fairwork itself, these interviews are a central part of the procedure, as they allow platforms to present evidence and clarify policies that are not always publicly available. The absence of this dialogue limited 99’s ability to share relevant information, which impacted the rating assigned to the company. We respectfully request that this context be recorded in the final report, so that readers understand that 99 did not have the opportunity to present evidence during the evaluation process.”

Fairwork Brazil’s response:

We sent an email on January 10, 2025 inviting you to a meeting. On January 11, 2025, we sent the invitation to the Fairwork Brazil Launch Workshop. On July 11, 2025, we sent the provisional scores and requests for evidence. On August 15, 2025 we wrote to the company again, requesting this note. Only this last contact was returned.



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ENDNOTES

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³⁹ <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/uber-pedao-stf-suspensao-de-todos-os-processos-sobre-vinculo-de-emprego-com-motoristas/>

⁴⁰ This section includes reports that illustrate and give voice to workers based on their experiences. These reports were not used in isolation to evaluate the platforms.

⁴¹ ABC Paulista is an area of the São Paulo Metropolitan Region that received its name from the initials of the three municipalities that comprise it: Santo André (A), São Bernardo do Campo (B) and São Caetano do Sul (C).

⁴² Harvey, D. (2024). Crônicas anticapitalistas: um guia para a luta de classes no século XXI. Boitempo Editorial.

⁴³ Grohmann, R., & Salvagni, J. (2023). Trabalho por plataformas digitais: do aprofundamento da precarização à busca por alternativas democráticas. Edições Sesc SP.

⁴⁴ Abílio, L. C. (2020). Plataformas digitais e uberização: Globalização de um Sul administrado. *Contracampo*, 39(1), 12-26.

⁴⁵ Silveira, S. A. (2024). Neocolonialismo ou imperialismo de dados? As novas veias abertas da América Latina?. In *Conocimiento, poder y transformación digital en América Latina* (pp. 61-73). Iberoamericana: Vervuert.

⁴⁶ CHEHAB, Gustavo Carvalho. Digital servitude of platform workers: the intensification and exploitation of work by algorithmic management. *Journal of the Regional Labor Court of the 10th Region*, v. 28, n. 1, p. 131-141, 2024.

⁴⁷ CARELLI, Rodrigo de Lacerda; ANDRADE, Maysa Santos de. Subjection and servitude at work in digital transport platforms: A case study in Rio de Janeiro.

Caderno CRH, v. 35, p. e022042, 2023.

⁴⁸ ZEM, Rafaela. App drivers work up to 60 hours a week, earn less than R\$ 4 thousand and accumulate debts; says research. In *G1*, 26/07/2025. Findable in <https://g1.globo.com/trabalho-e-carreira/noticia/2025/07/26/motoristas-de-app-faturamento-trabalho-horas-pesquisa.ghtml>

⁴⁹ VIEIRA, Sérgio. iFood’s digital bank makes the “delivery” of its first billion reais. In *Neofeed*, 13/02/2025. <https://neofeed.com.br/negocios/banco-digital-do-ifood-faz-o-delivery-de-seu-primeiro-bilhao-de-reais/>.

⁵⁰ International Labour Organisation. (2021) World Employment and Social Outlook: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. p. 31. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/WCMS_771749/lang-en/index.htm. (Accessed: 28 September 2023)

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² De Stefano, V. (2016) The rise of the ‘just-in-time workforce’: On-demand work, crowdwork and labour protection in the ‘gig-economy’. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. p. 1. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/travail/info/publications/WCMS_443267/lang-en/index.htm. (Accessed: 28 September 2023).

⁵³ Work-related costs include direct costs the worker may incur in performing the job. This may include, for instance, transport in between jobs, supplies, vehicle repair and maintenance, fuel, road tolls and vehicle insurance. However, it does not include transport to and from the job (unless in-between tasks) nor taxes, social security contributions or health insurance.

⁵⁴ The ILO defines minimum wage as the “minimum amount of remuneration that an employer is required to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which cannot be reduced by collective agreement or an individual contract.” Minimum wage laws protect workers from unduly low pay and help them attain a minimum standard of living. The ILO’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 C135 sets the conditions and requirements of establishing minimum wages and calls upon all ratifying countries to act in accordance. Minimum wage laws exist in more than 90 per cent of the ILO member states.

⁵⁵ In addition to direct working hours where workers are completing tasks, workers also spend time performing unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as waiting for delivery orders at restaurants and travelling between jobs and undertaking mandatory training (i.e., training activities that must be completed for workers to continue accessing work on the platform). These indirect working hours are also considered part of active hours as workers are giving



this time to the platform. Thus, 'active hours' are defined as including both direct and indirect working hours.

⁵⁶ In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local minimum wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost.

⁵⁷ Where a living wage does not exist, Fairwork will use the Global Living Wage Coalition's Anker Methodology to estimate one. In the case of Brazil, the DIEESE indicator of minimum necessary wage was used.

⁵⁸ In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local living wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost data evidencing all workers earn a living wage after costs.

⁵⁹ The ILO recognises health and safety at work as a fundamental right. Where the platform directly engages the worker, the starting point is the ILO's Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (C155). This stipulates that employers shall be required "so far as is reasonably practicable, the workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to health", and that "where necessary, adequate protective clothing and protective equipment [should be provided] to prevent, so far as is reasonably practicable, risk of accidents or of adverse effects on health."

⁶⁰ The ILO's Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), establishes nine classes of benefit (medical care and benefits in respect of sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injury, family, maternity, invalidity and survivors). Source: <https://webapps.ilo.org/public/english/revue/download/pdf/ghai.pdf>, p.122.

⁶¹ The ILO's Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC 2006), Reg. 2.1, and the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (C189), Articles 7 and 15, serve as helpful guiding examples of adequate provisions in workers' terms and conditions, as well as worker access to those terms and conditions.

⁶² As stated in international standards, ethical data protection includes aspects such as legitimacy and lawfulness, proportionality, purpose limitation, transparency, quality, data subject's rights (access, rectification, evaluation, erasure, and portability), accountability, and collective rights. Also, when using AI, the rights to be informed about it and to have a human interface.

⁶³ Workers should have the option of escalating

grievances that have not been satisfactorily addressed and, in the case of automated decisions, should have the option of escalating it for human mediation.

⁶⁴ In accordance with the ILO Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and applicable national law.

⁶⁵ A mechanism for the expression of collective worker voice will allow workers to participate in the setting of agendas so as to be able to table issues that most concern them. This mechanism can be in physical or virtual form (e.g. online meetings) and should involve meaningful interaction (e.g. not surveys). It should also allow for ALL workers to participate in regular meetings with the management.

⁶⁶ For example, "[the platform] will support any effort by its workers to collectively organise or form a trade union. Collective bargaining through trade unions can often bring about more favourable working conditions".

⁶⁷ See the ILO's Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (C087), which stipulates that "workers and employers, without distinction, shall have the right to establish and join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation" (Article 2); "the public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict the right or impede the lawful exercise thereof" (Article 3) and that "workers' and employers' organisations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority" (Article 4). Similarly the ILO's Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (C098) protects the workers against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment, explaining that not joining a union or relinquishing trade union membership cannot be made a condition of employment or cause for dismissal. Out of the 185 ILO member states, currently 155 ratified C087 and 167 ratified C098.

⁶⁸ If workers choose to seek representation from an independent collective body of workers or union that is not readily recognized by the platform, the platform should then be open to adopt multiple channels of representation, when the legal framework allows, or seek ways to implement workers' queries to its communication with the existing representative body.

⁶⁹ If workers choose to seek representation from an independent collective body of workers or union that is not readily recognized by the platform, the platform should then be open to adopt multiple channels of representation, when the legal framework allows, or seek ways to implement workers' queries to its communication with the existing representative body.



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